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German  un I f I cat  I on  has not on I y  changed  the poI It  I ca  1 and  econan  I c  I andscape 
In  Germany  but  also  In  Europe  with  maJor  repercussions  on  the  western 
European  Integration  process.  MaJor  swings  In  econanlc  demand  dyn81111cs  and 
econan  I  c  poI Icy  dIsturbances  In  Germany  fo  I I  ON I ng  econan  I c,  monetary  and 
social  union  since mld-1990  spilled  over  to  partner  countr les  and  changed 
traditional  positions  In economic performance. 
This  paper  tries  to  analyse  and  assess  the  changes  and  their  lftl)llcatlons 
for  the German  econany and  the EC.  In part  I  a  description and assessment of 
economic consequences of unification for East Germany  Is given,  covering the 
adjustment  processes  for  output,  the  labour  market,  price and  wage  setting 
and  the  dramatIc  change  In  the  externa  I  performance  and  pub I I  c  f 1  nance  of 
East  Germany.  This  Is  foiiONed  by  sane proposals which could  form part of a 
remedy  for  dea  I I ng  wIth  the  co  I I apse  of  the  East  German  econany.  The 
proposa Is  cover  I aboUr  market  and  capIta  I  stock  1  ssues  as  we 1  1  as 
recommendations  for  fiscal  policy and  supply side pol Icy  In unified Genmany. 
Part  11  analyses  the  changed  pattern  of  the  German  econcmy.  Special 
attention  Is  given  to  the  paradls;Jn  In  fiscal  policy,  and  the  unsolved 
redistribution  Question  which  Is  leading  to a  very  problematic  pol Icy mix, 
wIth  negat I ve  repercussIons  for  grONth  and  econan  I c  mcmentun  1  n  both 
Genmany  and  Europe. 
Part  I I 1  focuses on  short  and medium-term effects on  the Community  econcmy. 
Both  the  posIt  I ve  demand  effects  (hIgher  exports  to  Germany)  and  the 
negat I ve  monetary  effects  (hIgher  Interest  rates  throughout  Europe)  are 
dealt  with.  Attention  Is  also  given  to  probable  conseQUences  of  German 
unl f teat I  on  for  the  process  of  European  econanlc  lntegrat  I on.  The  paper 
concludes with  a  short  assessnent of  hON  far  lessons can  be drawn  fran  the 
experience with German  unification for both Western  European  Integration and 
Eastern European  transformation. (2) 
-I-
I •  CONSEQUENCES  AND  PROSPECTS  FOR  EAST  GERMANY 
1.  On  the road  to unification 
The  opening  of Hungary's western  border  In mld-1989 was  the  trigger  for 
dranatlc  changes  not  only  In  Germany  but  throughout  Europe.  Within 
months,  the  m  I grat  I on  of  thousands  of  East  German  c 1  t 1  zens  to  West 
Germany,  at  f I rst  vI  a  Hungary  bUt  I ater  vI  a  Czechos I ovak i a  and  Po I and 
also,  led to the fall of  the Berlin Wall  and ultimately to the overthrow 
of  the C0111'Unist  regime  In East Germany.  Within  three weeks of  the fall 
of  the  Berlin  Wall,  Chancellor  Kohl  out lined  his  vision  of  a  gradual 
evo  I utI  on of cannon  I nst  I tut  Ions  between  the FRG  and  the G:JR,  I ead  I ng  to 
a  federation  of  the  two  German  states.  On  6  February  1990,  the 
Chancellor  praposed  negotIatIons  on  the  creatIon  of  a  monetary  union 
which  began  In the fol towing month1. 
It was  the rapidly accelerating migration  from East  to West Germany which 
provided  the main  impetus  to early unlflcatlon.2  The  5cale of migration 
flows  was  explained  by  two  maln  factors.  Firstly,  the  younger  and  more 
hIgh  I y  sk I I I ed  menbers  of  the  East  German  I abour  force  perceIved  an 
opportunIty  to  obtaIn  a  we I 1-pa  I d  Job  In  West  Germany;  thIs  wou I d 
fac  I I I tate  a I  most  lnmed I ate  access  to  the  wea 1  th  of  the  West  German 
econany.  secondly,  migrants  from  the  East  were  legally  entitled  to 
support  fran  a  very  generous  system  of  public  allowances  on  taking  up 
residence  in West  Germany  (e.g.  Integration allowances,  unemplo~nt and 
other  soc I a I  secur i ty  benef I ts,  pub I I c  accanncx:la  t I on) .  The  transact I on 
costs  of  emigrating  from  East  to West  Germany  were  low  relative  to  the 
potential  economic benefits  so  that  the risks attached  to migration were 
not very significant. 
Being unable to cope with successful  economic restructuring and  having  no 
erect I b I I I ty  regarding  a  hard  currency  reg I  me  of  the  I r  own,  the  East 
German  goverrment  under  Krenz  and  MxtrON,  but  also  the  East  German 
par I i ament ,  hOped  for  an  econan  I  c  ba I 1  I ng-out  by  West  Germany  by  ear I y 
1990.  However,  urgent  demands  from  the East  Genman  parliament  to provide 
This  proposal  came  under  heavy  attack  from  West  German  pol ltlclans,  the 
Bundesbank  and  also the academic  scene.  Compare  e.g.  Sachverstandlgenrat 
1990). 
2  See  for more  Information on this  :Mayer  (1990). -2-
DA  13bn  to  East  Germany  to  start  an  envIsaged  restructurIng  programle 
were  refused  by  the  West  German  goverrrnent.  Only  the  currency  funds 
providing  .. welcane n-oney"  for  East German  visitors were augnented to CM  3 
bn.  Obviously,  WP,st  Genmany  was  not wt  I I lng  to balI  the GDR  out without a 
change  of  regime  and  a  transfer  of  econanic  policy  CXJll)etences  to West 
Genman  institutions. 
After  the  change  of  poI It  1  ca  1  reg I  me  In  the  <:DR  In  March  1990  ( in  the 
general  elections of  18  March,  the COU  obtained an overwhelming  n~jority 
as  the  party  favouring  full  unification at  the earliest  possible date), 
the first state treaty between  East  and West  Germany  was  negotiated;  this 
provIded  for  the  creation  of  a  monetary.  econan I  c  and  soc  i a 1  un 1  on 
effective  from  1  July  1990.  The  treaty made  the  OHMark  the  sole  legal 
tender  In  East  Germany  and  assigned  respons  i b I I I ty  for  East  German 
econanlc  policy  to  West  German  author It les  (Bundesbank,  Ministry  of 
Finance,  Ministry of  Economics.  Ministry  of  Labour  and  Social  Affairs). 
Financial  support  for  East  Germany  was  also provided  through  the Gennan 
Unity  Fund,  which  is designed  to channel  public transfers of  OM  120bn  to 
East Germany  over  the  five-year  per lod  1990-94. 
The  state  treaty was  the  fIrst  and  most  Important  step  to.vards  merging 
the  respective economies  and  ultimately  the political  systems of  the  two 
German  states.  In  fact,  German  economic.  monetary  and  social  union  was 
conceivable  only  against  the  background  of  an  anticipated  pol it leal 
unification.  The  signing of  the Unification Treaty  {31  August  1990)  and 
the accession of  the  newly  created East  Genman  Lander  to the  FRG  on  the 
basis  of  Article 23  of  the  Basic  Law  {3  October  1990)  ccm:>leted  the 
un 1 f 1  cat ion  process  in  I  ega I  and  I  nst I tut I  ona I  terms.  Hcwever • 
Integration of  the East  German  econ~ In  terms of  I lvlng  standards,  per 
capita  lncane  and  the  quality  of  the  public  and  private capital  stock 
remains a  major challenge. 
• • 
-3-
2.  The econotnlc approach to unl'f/catlon:  three siRJitaneous shocks  end 
no transitional period 
The  chosen  approach  to  un I f I cat  I on  was  to  expose  the  East  German 
econany3  to  three  "big  bangs":  (I)  the  lnmedlate  abolition  of 
protect ion I st  I nstrunents  as  a  consequence  of  econanlc  and  monetary 
un I on,  ( I I )  the  sudden  and  CO'f1) I ete  I ntegrat  I  on  of  the  East  and  West 
German  I abour  markets  as  restr  I ct  Ions  on  mIgratIon  were  I I fted,  and 
(Ill)  the  lmpos it  I  on  of  the  I ega I  and  I nst  I tut  lona  I  fnmework  of  a 
developed market  econany as a  conseQUence of political  unification. 
Wh i I e  the  ef  feet  of  rronetary  unIon  on  ncml na I  stab  I I I ty  In  Germany  was 
extensively  discussed,  the  Implications  for  ttie  real  econany  were  more 
significant.  The  factor  which  had  the  greatest  Impact  on  East  German 
output  and  EITl> 1  oyment  was  the  sudden  abo  1 I t 1  on  of  state  contra  Is  on 
trade  accompanied  by  the  replacement  of  the  non-convertible Ostmark with 
a  fully  convertible  and  overvalued  (In  relation  to  East  German 
productivity)  D-Mark.4  OVernight,  East  Germany  was  transformed  fran  an 
econany  characterized  by  repressed  I nf  I at  ion  to  a  market-or tented 
econany  where  denand  for  poor-QUa I I ty  danest I c  output  v 1  rtua  I I y 
collapsed  In  the  face of COTl)etltlon  fran West  German  Imports. 
f\bt  surprIsIng  I y,  the  heav  I I y  adn In  I stered  externa  I  trade  sysfern  was 
i 1 1-su i ted  to  the  ne.v  market  env  1  ronnent.  5  Hard-currency  Imports  soared 
because  of  chang I ng  preferences  and  the  lll.JCh  wIder  ava I I ab  I I I ty  of 
D-Marks;  meartNh 1 1  e,  exports  to  Western  countrIes  rerna I ned  neg I lg  I b I e. 
The  abrupt  col lapse  of  the  centrally  planned  trading  system  also 
reflected  low  demand  for  exports  from  the Oomeoon  countries and  the  fact 
3  An  ana I ys Is  and  assessment  of  the  East  German  econany  on  the  eve . of 
unifIcatIon  can.' be  found  In  DIW  ( 1990),  Mayer  /Thunann  ( 1990),  OECD 
(1991),  Sachverstendioenrat  (1990a),  Sachverstandtgenrat  (1990b). 
4  This  shift  of  ;;ne;tic  demand  was  generally  underestimated  by  most 
# 
econan I c  ana I ysts as they  I lm I ted net  Imports to absorpt I on capac It  I es as 
a  result  of  direct  Investment  In  the  course  of  a  catching-up  scenario. 
See  e.g.  OECD  ( 1990). 
5  See  for  an analysis of the East German  trade performance before and after 
unficatlon Hoffmann et al.  (1991). -- 4  ---
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Box  Chronology  of major events 
···---~- -·-·  --------------·---·-
1189 
9  November  The  9f'rlin  watt  was  opened  for East  German  cith:ena otter o  few  mon~hs  o~  poltti·~o.i 
crisis and  the  fleeing of  several  thousands  via Hungary  and  Czechoslovakia. 
28  November  Chancei lor  Kohl.  in  a  major  speech  dealing  with  the  di'lflaion  of  Europe  and  Germor1y 
announced  a  ten-point programme  envisaging  the progressive creation of  common  policy 
Institutions  between  the  FRG  and  GOR  leading  to  on  eventual  federation  of  the  two 
German  states. 
1110 
8  February  Faced  with  on  accelerating  pace  of  migration  to  the  Federal  Republic.  Chancel I{')• 
Kohl  proposed  to hold negotiations with  the East  German  government  on  the eration of 
a monetary  union. 
18  March  General  elections  held  in  East  Germany  giving  an  overwhelming  majority  to  the  COli 
and  the  parties  favouring  a  rapid  monetary  and  econanlc  union  followed  by  a  full 
unification at  the earliest possible date. 
12  April  Mr  de  ~iziere formed  the first  freely-elected Government  in  more  than  40  years with 
participation of  most  parties. 
6  May  Local  elections  in  the GDR. 
18  May  The  Treaty  creating  a  monetary.  e<;onanic  and  social  union  effective  'i  July,  was 
signed  by  the Governments  of  the GDR  and  FRG. 
17  June  The  East  German  parllcment  voted  the  "Treuhandgesetz~· which  subsequent iy  was  motie  Oft 
integral  part of  the  unification Treaty. 
1 July  The  Deutschemark  was  introduced  as  the  sole  legal  tender  in  the  two  Gennanya  on  th~ 
1 July 
22  July  The  East  Gennan  Parliament  passed  the  Law  reintroducing  the  five  former  States. 
23  August  The  East  German  Pari iament  voted  to  seek  accession  to  the  FRG  on  the  bash  Cit 
Article 23  of  the Basic Law. 
31  August  The  "Unification Treaty  ..  signed  by  the  two  Governments. 
12  September  The  "2+4"  Treaty  signed  in  Moscow. 
3 October  The  Genmon  Democratic  Republic  ceased  to exist  on  the  3  October  1991  and  the  Basic 
Low  was  extened  to  the entire German  area. 
2  December  Firat poat··-war  general  elections  in  unified Germany  giving a majority  to  the  liberal 
conservative parties CDU,  CSU  and  FOP  which  pranlaed  that  "no  tax  increases will  b~.t 
needed  f o  f i 11onee  German  unification  ..  ond  that  ••nobody  wi II  be  worse  off  but  a  I ot 
of  peoplot  will  feel  better off otter unification". 
31  December  The  tron~feroble  rouble  system  fur  trade  among  eastern  European  countries  expires. 
leadin9  to almost  a  total  holt  of  East  Genman  exports  to  these countries. 
Source  :  compare  OECf'l  (1991). 
• - 5  ---· 
that  exports  from  East  Germany  to  these countries  had  to be  paid  for  In 
hard  currency.  ConseQUently,  the  East  German  trade  balance,  which  was 
almost  In  equl I lbrlum  In  19~9,  showed  a  deficit of about  OM  120bn  (70%  of 
East Genman  GOP  over  the first  12 months after monetary union). 
in % of GOP 
Graph  1 
East German trade balance 
- goods and services -
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In  considering possible alternatives to the approach chosen  by  the German 
goverrments,  one  must  examine  the  objectives  to  be  achleved.6  Fran  an 
economic  viewpoint,  the  objectives  were  to  control  migration,  to 
transform a  centrally planned ~  Into a  market  economy,  to  Integrate 
the  East  German  econany  Into  the wor I  d  market  and  to  foster  grONth  1  n 
output  and  per  capIta  I ncane  In  East  Germany.  In  contrast  to  the 
Immediate  creation of  a  monetary  union,  such objectives could  have  been 
achieved by  (I) the abol ltlon of mobl  I lty  Incentives  (or  the  Introduction 
of  mobility  disincentives},  thereby  reducing  labour~rket  Integration, 
{II)  the  Introduction  of  tradable property  rights  and  of  a  market-based 
pricing system,  (I I I)  the  Introduction of a  separate convertible currency 
for  East  Gennany,  thereby  Increasing  the posslbll lty of compensating  for 
an  Inappropriate product mix  and  low  labour  productivity relative to the 
S  See also  OECO  (1990),  Tietmeyer  (1991). -6-
exchange  rate.  and  ( lv)  a  boost  to  public  Investment  with  the  help  of 
pub I I c  transfers  In order  to  I ncr  ease  the attract  I veness of East  Germany 
as  a  location  for  private  Investment.  However,  the  drive  towards  rapid 
political  unification  virtually  precluded  discussion  of  alternative 
strategies. 
As  the actua  I  approach  has been  QUIte d I f ferent,  It nust have a I so served 
other  than  strictly economic  goals.  Indeed,  economic  and  monetary  union 
had  been  just If  led  only  by  rapid  pol It  leal  unl f I cat  I on.  Public-choice 
conslderat Ions  lead  to  the  hypothesis  that  the  actual  approach  was  the 
appropriate strategy to achieve  rapid political  unification.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  the actual  approach  proved  to everybody  quite clearly that  the 
East  German  authorItIes  were  not  at  a I I  ab  I e  to cope  wIth  the  enonnous 
economic-policy  challenge of  transforming  the  East  German  econany.  Also 
as  a  consequence  of  the  dranatlc  collapse  In  economic  activity,  East 
German  poI It  I  c lens  were  prepared  not  on I y  to  speed  up  the  un I f I cat I  on 
process  but also to aim at rapid unification on  the basis of Article 23 
of  the  Basic  Law,  I.e.  unification  by  a  self-liQUidation  of  the  G:lR 
political  system. 
3.  Econoltllc  consequences  to date for East GerlfiMY 
w  1  th  the  openIng  of  the  border,  East  German  producers  I ost  vI rtua  I I y 
7 
the  I r  ent  I re  dcmest I c  market  overnIght.  Trade  def I ect  I on  fran  East 
to  West  Germany  QUIck I y  reached  very  hIgh  I eve Is,  wh I I e  East  German 
reta  1  1  ers  began  to  subst I tute West  German  for  East  German  goods.  As  a 
resu 1  t.  the  unprepared  East  German  producers  were  QUIck I y  reduced  to 
bankruptcy.  A  further  s ILJ1l)  In  danest I  c  product  I on  fo  I I  ONed  the 
transformatIon  of  Eastern  European  trade  relatIons  fran  a  system  o.f 
(non-convertible)  transferable roubles  to a  hard-currency  system and  was 
Intensified by  the disappearance of state regulations on  trade and by the 
lack of hard currency  In other Eastern  European countries.  On  a  genuine 
market  basis,  exports  of  East  German  products  to  Eastern  European 
countries collapsed almost completely after January  1991. 
1  For  an  early  discussion  of  the  IRl)llcat  Ions  of  unl f I cat I  on  for  the 
East  German  econcmy,  see  KrOaer  ( 1990).  See  also  M>rgan  Guaranty 
(1991). -7-
3. 1  The  adjustment of output 
8 
Enl) I r I ca  I  evIdence  based  on  est  I  mates  by  pr I vate-sector  I nst  I tut  Ions 
(such  as  the  Berlin-based  DIW)9  and  other  Indicators  (such  as 
prOduction  Indices,  retail-sales turnover,  the evolution of  the external 
balance vis-a-vis West  Gennany,  and  laboUr  market  data)  clearly  Indicate 
a  severe  s I unp  in  output  .  In  1990,  the  dec I I ne  In  c.:DP  vo  I une  may  have 
been  about  15%  and  a  further  dec I 1  ne of as rruch  as  25%  1  s  1 1  ke  1  y  to have 
occurred  In  1991. 
TABLE  1 :  CUTPUT  AHJ  PR:D.CT IV  I TV  IN EAST  GEFNANY 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
<?DP  (nan Ina  I ,  bn  CJA)  234  178  159  213  262 
GOP  growth  (real)  -19  -20  7  9 
GOP  deflator  (%change)  -6  12  25  13 
Productivity/head  (%change)*  -9  13  13  9 
- In% of West  German  productivity*  32  29  32  36  38 
*  50% of alI  short-time workers are treated as actually unemployed. 
--------·-----------------------------------
~v.r:.~~  ~  Conn i ss  1  on  forecast  ( r-t>v.  1991 ) 
The  abrupt  shift  in  denand  to  imported  products  and  the  collapse  of 
exr)l,~)::--t  markets  In  Eastern  Europe  have  led  to  a  dramatic  fall  In 
ind~strial  production;  gross  value  added  In  Industry  sti II  represented 
more  than 44%  of  total  gross value added  In the second half of  1990  (West 
Germany:  40.5%).  By  late surmer  1991,  the  level  of product lon  seened  to 
have  stab  I I I zed  at  about  one  thIrd  of  that  recorded  before  tronetary 
un ion.  On  the one  hand,  output of consuner  goods  for  the danest I c  market 
(e.g.  food  and  textiles)  collapsed  Immediately after  the  Introduction of 
the  D-Ma.rk  to  sane  3~  of  Its  earlier  level.  On  the  other  hand, 
output of  1  nvestment  goods  and  exports dec I 1  ned  by  .. on I y"  20)(,-30%  In  the 
Bofficial  national  accounts  figures  for  East  Germany  do  not  shaN  the 
z!unp  In  output  as  a  result  of  currency  union,  since  the  statistical 
off  tee  has  not  expressed  existing  national  accounts  figures  for 
ear 1 i er per 1  ods  In  terms of D-Marks. 
9  see  e.g.  Q.l~  (1-2/1992)  or  the  Quarterly  reports  o'f  the  DIW  In 
cooperation  with  the  lnstltut  fur  Weltwlrtschaft  on  .. macroeconanlc  and 
entrepreneurial  adjustment  processes  In  East  Gennany"  (DIW  12/1991, 
24i1991,  39-40/1991  and  51-52/1991). -8-
Initial  phase of monetary union;  these  Industries could still sell  their 
products within the transferable-rouble system until  the end of  1990 and 
thus  were  not  affected  to  the  same  extent  by  tronetary  unIon.  HaNever, 
the  transferable-rouble  system  was  abolished  In  January  1991  and  the 
supp  I I ers  of  Investment  goods  were  then  a I so  exposed  to  hard-currency 
C01'1)et It  I  on.  OlnseQUent I y,  the  fa  I 1  1  n  outpUt  of  1  nvestment  goods  was 
postponed  for  only  about  six months  and  output  dropped  to about  301 of 
Its previous  level  In early 1991.  Even  these remaining exports rely to a 
considerable  extent  on  newly  Introduced  subsidies  which· particularly 
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Adjustments  In  the agricultural  sector primarily reflect  the  Integration 
of  a  centra  I I y  pI  anned  sector,  organ  I zed  I Ike  an  Industry,  1  nto  the 
Ccmrunlty's  Ccmnon  Agricultural  Polley  (CAP}  and  the  West  German 
agricultural  policy franework.  As  the CAP  Is also highly regulated,  East 
German  agriculture was  less dramatically affected by  the  Introduction of 
a  convert I b I e  currency.  HaNever,  output  s lt.J1l)ed  for  d I f ferent  reasons. 
Firstly,  the collapse of the old regime  left behind a  vacuun,  leading not 
on I y  to  a  breakcbYn  In  the  trad It  I  ona  I  d I str  I but  1  on  system  but  a 1  so  to 
I I QUId I ty prob  I ems.  Before market  InterventIons  under  the  CAP  cou I d  be 
made,  the  I oss  of  c:tanest I  c  markets  and  depressed  agr 1  cu  1  tura  1  1  ncxmes 
• (3) 
-9-
resulted  In  a  sharp fal I  In  emplo~nt in this heavl ly overmanned  sector. 
Gross  value  added  in  agriculture  Is estimated  to  have  plunged  by  almost 
50J(.  In  the  second  half  of  1990.  Secondly,  the  transformation  of  this 
sector  fran co  I I  ect I  ves  to sma I I  and  med I  un-s I  zed  farms  was  hi ndered  by 
East German  fanners'  unwl I I lngness or  lnabl I lty to accept entrepreneurial 
r I  sks  because  of  uncI ear  property  r 1  ghts  and  a  shortage  of  I i quid  i ty. 
Thus,  the  typical  response  has  been  to  reduce  agricultural  activity  by 
participating  In  set-aside  programnes  and  by  leasing  land  and  farms  to 
western  investors.  Finally,  Community  Intervention prices are  lower  than 
those applying  under  the previous  regime.  Early  Indications  now  suggest 
that  agricultural  output  Is  about  to stabilize at existing  levels while 
the  transformation  to  a  structure  In  line  with  national  and  EC 
regulations and  pol icy objectives  Is continuing slowly. 
The  East  German  construction  sector  has  been  affected  by  the  removal  of 
centra  1  I  zed  contra  I  of  supp 1  y  and  demand  and  by  enonrous  I I  quId I ty 
constraints  on  potential  (private  and  public)  Investors.  Nevertheless, 
construction activity  has  declined  by  only  about  5%,  mainly  as  a  result 
of  reduced  res I  dent I  a I  Investment.  The  out I  ook  for  construct I  on 
act I  vI ty,  whIch  has  been  I  dent I f I  ed  as  potent I  a I I  y  the  ma i n  source  of 
recovery  for  the  East  German  econany,  is  very  pron is  i ng.  New  pub I I  c 
orders  rose  sharply  as  a  consequence  of  the  Economic  Revival  Programme 
for  East  Germany.  However,  residential  construction  is stl I I  restrained 
by  severe  liquidity  constraints.  Moreover,  capacity  problans  may  soon 
emerge as both the capital  stock and  the  labour  force are adjusting  only 
slowly to the new  demand  profIle. 
On  a  dlsaggregated basis,  the economic  performance of  the services sector 
has  been  variable.  Develoc:rnents  are  pranlsing  In  areas  traditionally 
underdeve I  oped  I  n  camun I st  econam I  es  (e.g.  the  f I  nanc I  a I  sector  and 
I i bera I  professions) .  Other  servIces  have  suffered  on  account  of  the 
d 1  f f i  cu 1  t I  es  1  n  manufactur I  ng,  g I  cx:my  macroeconam I  c  prospects  and  the 
relatively  ION  I  ncane  levels  of  pr lvate  households  canpared  to  sharply 
Increased prices.  Furthenmore,  the turnover of East German  retailers has 
been  adversely affected  by  ~.deflection across  the old  bOrder  and  by 
mat 1-order sales. -10-
3.2  The  l!ld)ustment  of emp/e7,1ment 
The  East  German  laboUr  market  Is,  at  present,  under  pressure  .from  three 
sources.  FIrst  I y.  pI  ung I ng  output  due  to  the  I oss of  both  danest I  c  and 
export markets  lrrplles a  corresPOnding reduction  In  Ef11)1o~t, mainly  in 
manufactur lng.  Secondly,  the  shl ft fran  I neff lctent central  planning  to 
more ef  f I  c I ent market-or  I en  ted managanent  and  product I on methods  Is a I so 
likely to reduce  emplo~nt significantly  In all  sectors.  The  structure 
of  East  German  811) I  o~nt  was  c I ear I y  not  based  on  an  ef  f 1  c 1  ent 
a I I ocat  I on of resources.  and the scope for  1  ncr  eased product I v 1  ty through 
a  rationalization  of  labour  rrust  be  exploited.  Finally,  East  German 
wage  formation  Is  less  related  to  the productivity  and  profttabiilty of 
East  German  enterprises  than  to wage  developments  In  West  Gennany;  this 
111'1)11es  a  rapid  catching-up of  East  German  wage  levels.  Therefore,  the 
reorganization of existing enterprises may  prove more costly  in  tenms of 
Job  losses than was originally anticipated. 
Tota I  En1ll o~nt has  a I ready  dropped  quIte  dremat I ca I I y,  push 1  ng  the 
numer  of  registered unemp I oyed  and  short-t  I  me  workers  to a I  most 3"" of 
in mio. 
Graph 3 
Labour market developments 
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the  laboUr  force  In  1989. 10  Ha.vever,  the  adjustment  In  enployment  Is 
by  no  means  ccmplete.  With  GJP  volune  falling  by  about  40X,  between 
end-1989  and  end-1991  and  given  the  need  for  sharp  productivity 
irnprovanents  wlthtn  surviving  East  German  enterprises,  a  reduction  in 
~loyment of between  4  and  5 million  Jobs may  occur  before the hoped-for 
recover·y of output  reverses  the overall  emplo~t trend  . 
.Job  i osses  w  I I I  be  concentrated  In manufacturIng  Industry  but  w  I I I  a I so 
occur _in  the agricultural  and  non~rket sectors.  On  the other  hand,  Job 
creation  as  a  result of  expansion  In  the services sector  could offset or 
even  exceed  Job  losses  In manufacturing.  With respect  to the overstaffed 
pub I 1  c  sector,  a  substantIa  I  rat  lona  I I zat I on  of  the  I abour  force  Is 
unlikely  for  adnlnlstrative,  legal  and  political  reasons.  Furthenrore, 
the  imp I enentat I on of West  German  I aws  and  procedures requIres  a  trainIng 
and  transitional  period  for  existing  staff  Implying  reduced 
''productivity...  Finally,  the  legacy  of  the  former  cannunlst 
adnlnlstratlon,  e.g.  the  resolution  of  nunerous  disputes  over  property 
rights.  wi I I  require  additional  public-sector  employees.  Therefore, 
public-sector  emplo~nt  may  remain  fairly  high  during  a  longer 
transitional  period. 
3.  3  The  ad  )us  tment  of wages  and prIces 
In  the  o 1  d  CDR,  pr Ices  and  wages  were  deterrn  I ned  not  by  denand-supp  I y 
conditions but by  pol itlcal considerations.  Whl le prices for basic goods 
and  services  (food,  housing,  energy,  etc.)  were  heavl ly subsidized,  most 
other  products  were  subject  to  very  high  luxury  taxes  and  production 
levies designed to constrain demand  to preval ling  levels of supply and  to 
finance subsidies  In other  fields. 
FoiiONtng  nnnetary  union,  prIces  for  tradables  adJusted  aiiTOst 
Immediately  (after  same  over- and  under-shooting)  to West  Genman  levels; 
this  reflected  the  canplete  Integration  of  the  West  German  and  East 
German  goods  markets.  While  the  prices  of  previously  subsidized  goods 
doubled  or  even  trebled,  the  prices  of  goods  that  had  previously 
·;-o Fur·thermore,  about  1 . 9  m  I I I I on  former I y  EJ1l) I oyed  peop I e  are  no  I onger 
shoWn  In  East  Genman  labour~rket  statistics,  having  taken  early 
retlrenent,  re-entered  the  education  system,  enlgrated  or  becane 
cross-border  commuters. -12-
attracted  high  taxation  collapsed  by  uP  to  SOJ(,;  the  price  Index  for 
Industrial  products fell  by aboUt  301. 
Prices of  non-tradables,  no  longer  subJect  to actnlnlstratlve regulation, 
have been mov 1  ng  In  I 1  ne w 1  th oost deve  I opnents s I nee unIfIcatIon.  Other 
administered  prices  (In  particular  rents  and  transport)  were  only 
partially deregulated  bUt  prices  for  energy 
and public transport services have almost doUbled during the first twelve 
m:>nths.  After roonetary union hoUsing rents,  stIll  frozen at the  level  of 
the mld-1930s,  were  subJect  to a  first moderate  Increase  In OCtober  1991 
and  maintenance  charges  for  a  more 
realistic  level.  The  latter  led  to  an  enormous  JUT1l  In  the  overall 
consuner  pr Ice  Index,  as  these charges  had  prevIous  I y  been borne  by  the 
Goverrment  and  have  anerged  as  sign If  lcantly  higher  than  thOse  which 
characterIze  other  market-or lented  econcmles.  Nevertheless, ·the  rate of 
return  on  the  existing  housing  stock  renalns  beiON  that  reQUired  to 
stlfYIJiate  Investment  so  that  dEmand  far  exceeds  the  supply  of 
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The  movenent  I n  the  over  a I I  cost-of-I I vI  ng  Index  In  East  Germany 
Indicates  an  Initial,  aggregate  fall  before  monetary  union  arne  Into -13-
effect;  this  trend  reflected  suppliers'  attempts  to  run  down  stocks of 
East  Genman  products and  the net  downward  effect on  prices of changes  In 
the  system  of  taxes  and  subs I d I es.  Thereafter  ,  monetary  un I on  and  the 
lmpl led price adjustments  led to some  further  decl lne  in the price  level. 
AI I  In alI,  the overal I  fall  In  the  consumer  price  Index  may  Imply  same 
Increase  In  purchasing  poyer  soon  after monetary  union  began.  HoNever, 
subsequent  cost  (wage)  deveiQJ:ments  In  services  and  the  adjustment  of 
actnlnistered  prices  led  to  a  continuous  and  quite  steep  rise  In  the 
overal I  Index,  which  In February  1992 was  about  16%  above  Its  level  of a 
year  ear I 1  er  .  Th 1  s  steep  r I se  Is  ma 1  n 1  y  a  ref  I ect  I on  of  the  st  I I I 
lncanplete  process  of  transition  fran  actninlstered  prices  to  market 
11 
prices. 
German  economic,  monetary and  social  union as wei I  as  pol itlcal  union was 
triggered  and  driven  by  the  Integration  of  the  two  labour  markets, 
implying  a  likely  catching-up  of  East  German  wages  relat lve  to  West 
German  I eve  1  s. 12 
The  outcane  of  co  1  I ect I ve  wage  agreements  I n  East 
Germany  differs  from  sector  to  sector,  with  the  differentiation  in  the 
grONth  of  salaries  broadly  In  I tne  with  the  overall  economic  situation 
and  prospects  in  each  individual  sector.  Thus,  branches with  favourable 
prospects  (such  as  bankIng  and  Insurance,  services,  and  construct ion) 
agreed  wage  I eve Is  equ Iva  I ent  to nnre  than  60%  of  the  respect I ve  West 
German  level  in  early  1991.  Wage  levels  In  Industry  general_ly  rena In 
beiON  this  benchnark.  In  the  public  sector,  where  productivity-related 
wage  format ion  1  s  d Iff  leu It  to  apply,  wage  adjustment  has  proceeded 
slowly relative to other  sectors.  It should also be noted that statutory 
wage  levels equivalent  to 60%  of  the West  Gennan  level  may  be equivalent 
to  1  ess  than  50%  of  the  ef  feet I ve  West  German  wage.  F Ina I I y,  the 
coverage  of  statutory  wage  agreements  In  East  Germany  Is  less 
canprehens I ve  than  In  West  Germany;  on I y  emp I oyer  s  who  be I ong  to  an 
employers'  association are bound  by  these agreements.  Consequently,  wage 
1  eve  1  s  1  n  East  German  Industry  are  probab 1  y  not  more  than  50%  of  the 
current West  Genman  level.  Nevertheless,  they are certain to rise further 
In the near  future and  are not  justified by relative productivity.  OUtput 
TfTher~i-;~- any  case,  an  Index-related  problen  when  It  canes  to 
assessing  the  overall  rate  of  inflation  as  the  published  Index  Is 
stl I I  based  on  a  pre-unification  basket  of  goods  and  services  but 
major  shifts  In  relat-Ive  prices  and  changes  In  consuner  preferences 
have resulted  In a  different pattern of expenditure. 
12  See  also Burda/Funke  (1991)  and  Sinn/Sinn  (1991). - 14-
per  eY1J I oyee  In  East  German  Industry  Is est  I  mated to be  JOI.I  of  the  I eve  I 
In West  German  Industry. 13 
3.4  The  adJustment  o'f  the  saving-Investment  balance  and  the  current 
account 
The  dramatic  shl ft  In  East  German  demand,  the  cot lapse  of  trade  with 
Eastern  Europe  ear I y  In  1991  and  the outdated  East  German  capIta  1  stock 
have  led  to  a  considerable  deterioration  In  sectoral  saving-Investment 
ba I ances  and  hence  In  the  a I I -German  externa  I  current  account .  w  t th 
demand  significantly  In excess of domestic supply,  East Genmany  has  been 
running  a  huge deficit on  Its external  trade  and  services  balance  since 
the  start  of  the  unIfIcatIon  process  o  DespIte  subsidIzIng  exports  to 
Conecon  partners,  the  trade deficit reached  38%  of estimated  East  German 
<DP  I n  the second  ha  I f  of  1990 and  has cont I nuec:l  to r I se. 
TABLE  2:  THE  EXTERNAL  PERF'OFNAN:E  OF  EAST  GEFM\NY  ( va I ues,  bn  I:M) 
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Exports. of goods to West  Germany  5o7  7.3  13 0  1  20.6  25.8 
Imports of goods  fran West  Germany  7.5  48.1  144.0  163.8  174. 1 
Export of servIces to West  Germany  3.0  8.5  9. 1  12.7  15.6 
Imports of services fran West  Germany  4.5  28.6  48.2  49.3  43.3 
Trade balance with West Germany  -3.3  -80.9  -170.3  -179.8  -175.9 
(goods and servIces) 
Export of factor  I ncane to West  Germany  2.9  13.2  19.9  21.6 
Import of  factor  I nccme  fran West  Germany  .2  .5  2.2  2.4 
Factor  1  ncc:me  ba  I ance wIth West Germany  2.8  12.7  17o7  19o 1 
Exports of goods & services to abroad  44.8  42.2  26.5  22.3  25.1 
lfll)Orts of goods & services fran abroad  40.9  24.0  19. 1  22.1  25.3 
Trade balance with abroad  (goods and  3.9  18.2  7.4  .2  -.2 
services) 
Public transfers  fran West Germany  6.1  43  .. 0  90.0  100.0  100.0 
OJrrent 80CX)Unt  ba  I ance  6.7  3.1  -60.2  -61.9  -5.7 
Source  :  Commission  forecast  (f\bv.  1991) 
13  The  need  for  a  consIstent  rea  I  wage-product I vI ty  balance  1  s  erphas  1  zed 
by Siebert  (1990). -15-
As  huge  public  transfers  fran  West  Germany  are  a I IaNing  pr lvate 
hoUseholds  to maintain  a  level  of  consumption  Independent  of  changes  In 
. the  danest lc  product ion  systan,  there  Is  effectively  no  current-account 
constraint. 
The  huge  s I  ze  and  sudden  emergence  of  the  denand-supp I  y  gap  I  n  East 
Germany  fInds  its  maIn  counterpart  In  a  corresponding  SN I  ng  In  the 
a I I  -German  pub I i  c-sector  ba I  ance.  Desp 1 te  a  COll)rehens 1  ve  package  of 
revenue-enhancing  measures  ear I  y  In  1991 ,  the  surp I  us  on  the 
public-sector  balance  In  1989  (0.2%  of  West  German  GOP)  was  transfonned 
Into a  deficit of 3.6% of al l~rman GOP  In  1991. 
A tentative assessment of  the sectoral  financial  balances  In  East Germany 
In  the  first six months after monetary  union  (I.e.  In  the second  half of 
1990)  shows  a  balanced  situation  for  private  households;  this  Is  due  to 
pub I ic  transfers  of  about  CM  40bn  (38%  of  East  German  GDP)  fran  West 
Germany.  The  pub I i c  sector  was  a I  so  in  ba I  ance,  wh I I  e  the  corporate 
sector  ran  a  deficit of  CM  23bn  {22%  of  East German  GJP).  The  Imbalance 
in  thP,  corporate sector  Is the result  not of a  strong surge  In  Investment 
but of  a  sharp stump  in  revenue due to a  poor  competitive position on  the 
domestic market;  thus,  the  financial  accounts of  East German  enterprises 
are  c I  ear I  y  In  a  most  unhea I  thy  state.  .In  West  Germany,  the  f I  nanc I  a I 
accounts  of  the  corporate  sector  ref I  ect  a  cent I  nuat ion  of  the  very 
buoyant  investn~nt performance,  with  financial  balances deteriorating but 
remaining  In  a  generally healthy condition.  Private househOlds  Increased 
their saving mainly as a  result of  tax cuts  In  early  1990. 
TABLE  3:  SECTORAL  INVESlMENT-SAVINGS  BALANCES  IN  EAST  GEFJMNY  (In bn  CM) 
II  90  1991  1992  1993 
Private households  .3  5  10  15 
Enterprise sector  -23.4  -00.2  -41.9  -37 
Pub I I  c  sector  0  -15  -30  -35 
CUrrent  account  -23.1  -60.2  -61.9  -57 
SQJ.Jrces  :  Bundesbank,  Connisslon  forecast  {f\bv.  1991) 
The  rrost  imJX>rtant  factors  determinIng  the  a I I  -German  current-account 
b~  1  anct:":  were the deter I  oration of  the East German  corporate ba I  a nee sheet - 16-
ana  the  surge  in  pub I I c-sector  borrcw  I ng.  Ear I y  In  1991 ,  the  I at  ter 
Increased  furt~er as  a  result of significant unilateral  transfers  to the 
UnIted  States  ( 1  n  connect 1  on  w I th  the G.J I f  war)  and  to the SovIet  UnIon 
(In connection  with  the withdrawal  of  Soviet  troops  from  East  Gennany). 
Consequently,  the current-account balance showed  a  significant deficit of 
about  011  34bn  I n  1991 ,  CCJ11)8red  to  a  surp  I us  of  DA  77bn  I n  the  sane 
period a  year  earl ler. 
4.  The need to establish a  'ftNoureble  econo~t~lc-POIIcy 'fr~k 
The  goal  of economic policy  Is to transfonn the East  Genman  economy  Into 
a  competitive  and  dynamic  market  economy,  preferably  relying  on 
I abour-1 ntens i ve  product I on  methods  but  wIthoUt  a  s ll.JT1)  In  pur·chas i ng 
pcwer.  All  of  this  requires  large-scale  adjustment.  The  results  up  to 
now,  however,  have  been  mass  unemplo~nt, a  sharp  fall  In  GOP  and  very 
high  public-sector  deficits.  These  disappointing  results  were 
unavo  1  dab  1  e  g 1  ven  the  cond 1  t Ions  preva  I I I ng  In  East  Germany.  F I rst  I y, 
emigration  remains  an  attractive  option  for  R1..1Ch  of  the  East  German 
I abour  force  unt I 1  such  t  I  me  as  I arge-sca  I e  capIta  I  f I ows  Into  East 
Germany  materialize.  Secondly,  the  East  German  econany,  Isolated  for 
decades  fran  develq:ments  on  world  markets  and  with  outdated  capital 
stock  and  product I on  methods,  ITlJSt  noN  be  rapId  I y  transformed  Into  a 
competitive  market  econany.  Thirdly,  after  more  than  forty  years  of 
centra  I  pI  ann I ng,  East  German  socIety  must  naN  ad just  to  a  systen  of 
decision-making  at  a  decentralized  or  micro  level.  Finally,  the 
population  is not wi I I lng  to accept  a  col lapse  In purchasing  power  during 
the adjustment  period.  Mbdels of systems to tackle undesirable migration 
flows  and  to  foster  large-scale capital  Inflows exist  (with  same  success 
1  n  West  Ber 1  1  n  but  I ess  so  In  the  Mezzog I or  no)  but  there  Is  no  pr 1  or 
experience  on  which  to  base  a  transfonnatlon  fran  central  planning  to 
14 
market-oriented economic management. 
4.1  Managing mass  unemployment 
A I thoUgh  the  ma i n  purpose  of  I abour  market  poI Icy  is  to  foster  the 
creation  of  new  and  self-sustaining  enployment,  there  Is  little doubt 
14  For  policy  choices  as  a  response  to  this  challenge  see  also  M)rgan 
Guaranty  {1991)  and Matthes  (1991). (4) 
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that  the East  German  labour  supply will  far  exceed  demand  over  the  next 
feN  years.  Two  d I f ferent  I abour  markets  ref I ect  I ng  a  dua I  econany  w I I I 
exIst  sIde-by-sIde  In  East  Germany  for  sane  tIme  to  cane.  On  the  one 
hand,  there will  be  fast-growing  sectors,  e.g.  services  and  those  parts 
of  manufactur I ng  Industry  wIth  a  modern  and  product 1  ve  cap 1  ta  I  stock 
financed by way of post-unification  Investment.  This part of  the econcmy 
w  I I I  be  ab  I e  to  pay  hIgh  wages,  as  product I vI ty  cou 1  d  even  surpass 
average  West  German  I eve Is.  On  the other  hand,  there w 1  I I  be  dec I In  I ng 
sectors,  e.g.  agriculture,  mining  and  parts of  the manufacturing  sector 
stll I  using pre-unification capital  stock.  The  survival  of these sectors 
and  branches  Is  a I ready  threatened  at  current  wage  1  eve  1  s.  As  the 
econcmy w I I I  be sp I It Into two extreme  I y  dIvergent  sub-econan  1  es and mass 
unemployment  will  be  unavoidable,  a  dUal  approach  to  labour-market 
management  Is necessary. 
The  first  element  of  this  approach  should  address  the  short-term 
management  of  mass  UneTl>l oyment .  In  academIc  c I rc  I es,  wage  subs I dIes 
have been  proposed  to make  It easter  to resolve  the daunting problems  on 
the  labour  market. 
15 
Indeed,  a  choice  exists  In  principle  between 
subsidizing  labour  costs,  capital  costs  or  both.  All  such  the  measures 
w  I I I  probab  I y  be  a lmed  at  fosterIng  Investment.  It has,  however,  to  be 
borne  In  mInd  that  busInesses  shou 1  d  rana In  prof 1  tab  1  e,  canpet It  1  ve  1  y 
sized  and  nunerous  enough  to  meet  the  enplo~nt  goal. 16  Sl:Jbsldles 
should  not  remain  pennanently  In  place  but  should  trigger  Investment  by 
renedy I ng  short-term  dIsadvantages.  M:>reover ,  f I nanc I a I  resources  are 
limited  or,  to  put  It another  way,  the  likely  rapid  catch-up  in  wages 
17 
w I I I  make  wage  subsIdIes  QUIte  expensIve.  On I y  1  f  Investors 
assume  that  subsidies will  continue  for  a  long  time will  Investment  In 
labour-intensive production  take place.  This,  hoWever,  would  Involve the 
danger  that  labour-Intensive  production  might  not  survive  without 
subsidies.  Moreover,  If wage  subsidies are provided only to existing East 
German  enterprises,  they  might  even  discourage  Investment  In  new 
15  see,  for example,  Akerlof et al  and  ~/Portes (1991). 
16 See Morgan Guaranty  (1991). 
17  The  suggested  (by  Aker 1  of)  trade-off  between  the  wage  1  eve  1  and  the 
M10Unt  of  subsIdIes  hard I y  seens  to  be  operat I ona I  gIven  the 
Institutional  structure  of  the  overall  German  labour  market.  Quite 
negative  on  this  point  are  also  5achverstandlgenrat  (1991)  or  DIW 
(36/1991). -18-
structures.  Indeed,  the  impl teat Ions  for  the relative competitiveness of 
subs  I d I zed  and  non-subs 1  d 1  zed  branches  and  enterpr  1  ses  w I I I  hInder  new 
Investment  in East  Germany;  this,  In  turn, will  result  In  a  slowing-down 
In the adjusbnent  process by supporting old non-competitive structures at 
the expense of new  and ~e  competitive structures. 
As  a  short-tenn response to unemplo~nt, consideration might be given to 
the  creation,  on  a  tanporary  basis,  of  a  "parallel"  labour  market  and 
econany  consIst I ng  of  pub I I c  Job-creatIon  progrcmnes,  pub  I I c I y  f i nanced 
Job-procurement  canpanles  (Beschaft lgungsgesellschaften),  etc.  The  goal 
shou I d  be to absorb as much of the unemp I oyed  I abour  force as poss I b I e  In 
this temporary paral tel  economy.  However,  production  In this part of the 
econany  shou I d  Interfere  as  I Itt  I e  as  poss I b I e  with  product ton  In  the 
private  sector  and  should  focus mainly on  the  provision of  publ lc  goods 
or  goods  with  positive  externalities  such  as  envlronnental  recovery, 
SOCial  3ervlces.  etc.  However,  salar les  In this  .. parallel"  l-abour  market 
wou I d  need  to  be  set  at  such  a  I eve  I  that  they  provIded  a  posItIve 
I ncent i ve  to  seek  emp I oyment  on  the  oampet It  I ve  I abour  market . 
Furthermore,  public subsidies to employment  In the paral lei  labour market 
should  be  phased  out within  a  short  time.  Negative  repercussions  on  the 
rea I  econany cannot  be avoIded,  gIven  the size of the  I abour  force  I Ike  I y 
to  be  employed  in  thIs  "para I lei"  market.  However,  negat lve  effects 
wou I d  probab I y  be  I ess  damagIng  than  those  reI  a ted  to  other  measures 
designed  to manage  mass  unemployment.  In general,  the shift of official 
labour--market  pol icy  In  the  direction  of  Job-creation  progranmes  and 
Job-procurement  canpantes,  which  took  place  In  mid-1991,  Is  to  be 
we I caned.  Never  the  I ess,  such  schenes  need  to  be  stepped  up  s I nee 
alternative  schemes  to delay or  avoid  employment  adjustment  In  the  real 
economy  e.g.  through  special  short-time working  schemes or wage  subsidies 
for  (parts  of)  the  private  sector,  are  Increasingly  acting  as  a 
disincentive  as  regards  the  adjustment  of  existing  enterprises, 
privatization and private capital  Inflows. 
Conp I enentary  to  the  .. para I I e ,..  I abour  market  but  of  a  rn::>re  med I un-term 
character  wou I d  be  I arge-sca  I e  retraInIng  of  the  I abour  force  as  the 
nature  of  1  abour  danand  In  East  Germany  changes. 18  At  present,  the 
most  pran  IsIng  areas  for  retraInIng  are  construct I on  and 
18  See also Fels/Schnabel  {1991). -19-
env i rorment-re  I  a ted  act I  vI t I  es  as  we I I  as  the  servIces  sector . 
Retraining  faci titles  and  progranmes  will  also  need  to  be  provided  by 
public-sector  institutions,  since  the  scale  of  reQUired  retraining 
activities  Is enormous  and cannot be managed  by  the private sector alone. 
Furthenrore,  the  spec I  a I  nature  of  the  I  abour  force  to  be  retraIned 
demands  a  more  flexible approach to retraining. 
4.2  Attracting private risk  c~ltal and privatization 
Large-scale private and  publ lc  Investment wl  II  be needed  to transfonm the 
East German  econany.  t-bvever,  the performance of both public and  pr lvate 
investment  to date has  been  poor.  Public  Investment  remains  hampered  by 
the  lack  of  administrative  absorptive  capabl 1 lty.  In  future,  both 
financial  and  real  resources might  became  binding  constraints  too.  With 
regard  to private  Investment,  there  is  no  obvious  reason  to assume  that 
Investors wl  I I  be more  hesitant  to  invest  In  East Germany  than elsewhere 
given  the  SM'le  expected  rates  of  return.  ConseQuently,  the  cautious 
approach of private  Investors,  despite the opening-up of a  completely new 
market,  must  Imply  the existence of  less visible disadvantages which  have 
reduced  the  expected  rate  of  return  and  have  thus  diminished  the 
attractiveness of East Germany  as an  Investment  location. 
Indeed.  until  mld-1991,  political,  social  and  legal  uncertainties,  e.g. 
concerning  property  rights,  constituted  a  major  obstacle  to  new 
Investment.  Unti I  then,  the publ lc authorities had  fal led  to  fonmulate  a 
coherent  frMlework  of  laws,  rules and  property  rights.  SUch  a  frameNOrk 
Is  a  fundamenta I  cond It I  on  for  a  market  econany  and  for  a  posIt I  ve 
Investment  climate.  Unfortunately,  the  authorities  initially  gave  the 
Al 
impression  of  hoping  for  a  Quasl-autanatlc  repetition  of  the  German 
''W! rtscha  ftswunder..  of  the  ear I  y  1950s.  As  thIs  fa i I  ed  to mater i  a I I  ze, 
the  Goverrment  introduced  ad  hoc  Investment  I  ncent i ves  and  subsIdies 
between  m  I  d-1990  and  ear I  y  1991 ;  on I  y  then  dId  at  tent  1  on  focus  on 
creating the necessary  legal  and administrative preconditions for  private 
Investment. -20-
Box  2  Wajor  lnve•tment-•upportlng mea•ure•  In  Ea•t C.nnany  (1990-1981) 
WEASlRS 
Reduce  acqul•ltlon co•t 
lnve•tment  grant  for equipment  (until  31  December1811: 
121.  thereafter 81) 
lnve•bnent  grant  (up  to 231)  from  the  joint programMe 
"Improvement  of  regional  tndu•try •tructure":  financed  by 
- the Federal  Government  and  the Lander 
- the European  Communltle• 
lnve•tment  grant  (up  to 901  for  bu•lne•e-related municipal 
infrastructure)  financed  by 
- the Federal  Government  and  the Lander 
- the European  Communltle• 
Special  taxation allowance• 
Two-year  exemption  fram  per•onal  and  corporate  Income  tax 
up  to OM  10  000  for enterprl•e• establl•hed before 
1 January  1991 
Creation of  appropriation• for  tangible aaaet• tranaferred 
to campanle•  In  the  fonner  GOR  and  for  Initial  loa•e• of 
the affl I late• 
Additional  (~) depreciation for equipment  inve•tment 
Exemption  fram  property  tax and  trading-capital  tax and, 
for  .mall  and  medlum-•lzed  enterprlaea,  reduced  trade-earning• tax 
Provl•lon of  concea•lonal  finance  and  guarantee• 
Several  programmes  providing  low-lntere•t credits.  liquidity 
credits and  guarantees  for  liquidity  loan• 
Source:  Compare  Bundesmlnl•terlum  fOr  Wlrt•chaft  (1991) 
IM.RATIQN 
1 July 1HO  to 
31  Dec•ber 19M 
1 July 1880  to 
30  June  1995 
1 January  1991  to 
31  December  1993 
1 July 1990  to 
30  June  1885 
1 January  1991  to 
31  Dec•b•r 1993 
1 January  1890  to 
·31  Dec•ber 1990 
1 January  1990  to 
31  Dec•ber 1991 
1 January  1991  to 
31  Dec•ber 1994 
s 1  nee m  I d-1991 ,  hONever,  the  I ega I  fr811eM)rk  for  Investment  has  1111)roved 
and  the  package  of  subsIdIes  Is  expected  to  boost  Investment 
s 1  gn 1  f 1  cant I y  s 1  nee  Investment  costs  In  East  Germany  have  nov  been 
reduced  by  up  to  75%.  Nevertheless,  sane  1111X)rtant  obstacles  to  rapid 
1  nvestment  grONth  st  I I I  exIst,  nane  I y  shortccm  I ngs  In  pub I I  c 
actnlnlstratlon  and  In  public  Infrastructure.  While  the  fonner  may 
lfTl)rove  In  the short  term,  the  latter will oontlnue to be felt for quite -21-
sane  tIme  as  a  resu It  of  budgetary  constraInts  and  I lm I tat  Ions  on 
capacity  In  both  the  public  and  pr lvate  sectors.  Nevertheless, 
cannltments  to  large-scale  public  Infrastructure  Investment,  albeit 
de I  ayec:t  by  pI ann I  ng  oonstra  I nts  at  adn  1  n 1  strat  1  ve  1  eve  1  ,  cou 1  d  boost 
expectations and  strengthen private  Investment. 
Opportunities  for  private  Investment  exist:  (I)  In  the modernization  of 
ex I  st  I  ng  I  nsta I I  at  Ions  st  I I I  rna In I  y  ONned  by  the  pub I I  c I  y  ONned 
Treuhandanstalt,  (I I)  In  the modernization  and  expansion  of  the  housing 
stock,  and  ( I I I )  In  the  construct I  on  of  ~I  ete  I  y  new  structures.  At 
present,  the outlook  for attracting risk capital  to create ~letely new 
structures  and  capacities  Is  most  promising,  since  the  canparatlve 
disadvantages of  East Gennany  as a  location  for  production are offset by 
generous  Incentive schemes.  If  publ lc  Infrastructure  Investment  plans are 
rea I I  zed,  these dIsadvantages may  have dIsappeared by  the tIme product 1  o, 
In  new  locations comes  on  stream  In  the mld-19905. 
The  creation of a  competitive and modern  services sector does not  reQuire 
generous  Investment  subsidies.  There  Is  already  evidence of  large-scale 
Investment  In  this sector,  Including banking,  Insurance and distribution, 
which  began  lnmedlately  after  monetary  union,  I .e.  before  the  var lous 
Investment  subsidies  were  announced.  Nevertheless,  Investment  projects 
In  the  services  sector  are  at  present  as  heavily  subsidized  as 
corresponding proJects  In  manufacturing  Industry. 
The  out I  oak  for  res I  dent I  a I  Investment  Is  a I  so  QUI te  pram IsIng  despIte 
the present  I  011  1  eve I of  rents.  As  Investment costs can  nON  be ref 1  ected 
In  rents and  since a  gradual  liberalization of  rent  regulations  began  In 
OctOber  1991,  expected returns  In  this field are progressively  Improving. 
However,  risk capital  wl  I I came mainly fran publ lc and  foreign sources as 
potential  East German  Investors suffer  from  I IQuldlty constraints. 
The  out look  for  attractIng  prIvate  rIsk  capIta  I  to  modernIze  outdated 
cap I  ta1  stock  Is,  hOIIever,  QUIte  g loony. 19  This  mal nly  affects  the 
rnanufactur I  ng  sector,  where  enterprIses  st  I I I  to  be  prIvatI zed  face 
special  problems  which  make  them  unattractive to potential  Investors. 
19  The  ln1)0rtance  of  privatization  Is  EIJl)haslzed  too  by  Fels/Schnabel. 
(1991). -22-
Firstly,  existing corporate debt,  which  accumulated  during  the years of 
centra  I I  y  pI an  ned  management,  rrust  In  pr Inc I  pIe  be  servIced  by  the  new 
ONners.  Second I  y,  many  bus I  ness  I  ocat Ions  are  poI I  uted  and  the  new 
ONners  are  expected  to  take  respons I  b I I I  ty  for  c I  ean I  ng-up  measures. 
Finally,  the Treuhandanstalt  has  tended  to  Interfere with the  Investment 
plans  of  new  Investors,  so as to encourage  the  retention of  as  much  of 
the  I  abour  force  as  poss  I b I  e,  thereby  hInder I ng  rapId  and  necessary 
I  ncr  eases  In  I  abour  product I  vI ty. 
TransformIng  ex 1st I  ng  corporate  debt  and  eco I  og I  ca I  rIsks  Into  pub I I  c 
debt  and  pub  1 1  c  rIsks  oou I d  substantIa  I I  y  aoce I  erate  the  prIvatIzatIon 
process.20  The  effect  on  the  balance  sheet  of  the  Treuhandanstalt 
could  even  be  positive and  risk capital  could  be attracted more  easl ly. 
Undoubted I  y,  the  present  pr I  vat I  sat I  on  strategy  of  the  Treuhandansta It 
handicaps  small  and  medium-sized  Investors  and  supports  the creation of 
an ol lgopol lstlc economic structure  In  East Germany.  Furthennore,  It has 
emerged  that  new  owners  do  not  always  wish  to maintain  production or  to 
modernIze  pI ant  and  machInery  but  sanet lmes  acQuIre  product I  on  pI ants 
simply  for  speculative reasons  (In expectation of soaring  land prices) or 
In  order to neutral lze potential  competition. 
4.3  Balancing public  finances  and stabilizing purchasing power 
Up  to  noN,  German  un I  f I  cat I  on  has  been  QUIte  cost I  y.  The  pub I I c-sector 
balance  has deteriorated  very significantly and  the  Increase  In  the real 
disposable  Income  of  private  households  In  West  Germany  as  a  result  of 
the  I  ncane-tax  cuts  of  ear I  y  1990  have  a I  ready  been  offset  by  hIgher 
soc 1  a I  secur I ty  contr I  but Ions  and  tax  I  ncr  eases.  Never the  1  ess,  pub I I  c 
transfers  to  East  Germany  have  so  far  been  used  maIn I y  to  underpIn 
consumption  rather  than to promote  Investment. 
In  estimating  the  resources  needed  to  finance  a  catching-up  process  In 
East Germany  and  to maintain  emplo~nt, one might  look  at the experience 
of  West  Berlin  before  unification.  The  situation  In  West  Berlin  was 
similar  to that of  East Germany  as  regards  the wl  I llngness of  the  labour 
force  to emigrate and  the cautious approach  of  private  Investors.  Under 
the  Ber I In  Ass I  stance  Law  of  1952,  a  package  of  pub I I  c  I ncent I  ves  to 
20  See also Pohl  ( 1991). -23-
counter  laboUr-force migration and  to promote  Investment  was  Introduced. 
In the  late  1980s,  more than tM 20bn  a  year  was  needed to  f lnance about 
million  jobs  and  to  facilitate  the  smooth  operation  of  an  economy  of  2 
m  I I I I on  peop  I e.  Havever,  these  f I nanc  I a I  burdens,  In  terms  of  extra 
outlays and  smaller  revenue ,figures at both  (Federal  and  Land)  levels of 
goverrment,  were  concerned  wIth  maIntaInIng  actIvity  In  the  sne l  I  West 
Ber I in  econany.  In  the  case  of  East  Germany,  an  econany  with  a  1  atxJ\Jr 
force  of  about  8  m  I I I I on  and  a  tota  I  popu I at  1  on  of  16 r'lt I I ion  , 
substantia  I I y  greater  resources  may  be  needed  to  f I nanct~  the 
modernization  of  the  public  and  private capital  stock.  Oonsequ~~tiy.  a 
"bacK-of-the-envelope"  calculation  suggests  that  CM  160bn  a  ye,t~r  n-ay  be 
needed  durIng  the  1990s  to  avoid  the  anergence  of  a  peri  phP.r r'll  anci 
uncanpetttlve  East  German  econany.  This  financial  reouirEfllt:;!"'!t  •s 
equ Iva  I ent  to  the  change  In  the  pub I I c-sector  ba I ance  brought  aboUt  by 
the unification process so  far. 
The  understandable  decision  by  the  authorities  not  to  altON  purchasing 
power  to drop  dramatlcal ly  In  East  Gennany  has  absorbed  budget  resources 
to  the  tune of  about  5%  of  <DP  per  year.  A I though  It has  been  poss I b I e 
to borrow  this money  on  capital  markets,  a  more  solid  financing  base  Is 
needed  as  annual  transfers  of  this  order  of  magnitude will  be  required 
for  five  to  ten  years,  although  they  should  fall  over  the  period.  This 
wi I 1  require a  correspondingly  large domestic redistribution  in  favour of 
transfer  incare.  Such  a  redistribution  should  not  be  at  the  expense  of 
pr lvate  Investment  and  so  the  disposable  lncane  of  pr lvate  households 
rrust  be  targeted,  e.g.  through  tanporar I I y  hIgher  I ncane-tax  rates  and 
social  security  contributions  or  expenditure  cuts.  It  Is  desirable, 
therefore,  that  the  social  partners  should  not  seek  CCJll)ensating  wage 
Increases  but  should  take  these  requirements  into  account  when 
negotiating  new  wage  settlements  In  the early  1990s.  In view of  the need 
for  ongoing  wage  moderation  and  continued  social  consensus  In  Germany, 
both preconditions  for  a  positive  Investment cl lmate,  it may  be difficult 
to  reduce  corporate  taxation  over  and  above  those  measures  a I ready 
adopted  In  the course of  the unification process. 
4.4  Regulations,  subsidies and supply-side policy 
At  times  of  buoyant  investment  activIty,  reg I ona I  i nvesbnent  subsIdIes 
are  an  appropriate tool  to attract risk capital  by  changing  the  regional -24-
preferences  of  potent I a I  Investors.  At  t lmes  of  weak  Investment 
activity,  however,  It may  be more  promising  to concentrate  Initially on 
creat  I ng  a  pos I t I ve  and  favourab  I e  Investment  c I I  mate.  The  Investment 
climate  In  Germany  Is  deteriorating  at  present.  High  Interest  rates, 
unsusta  1  nab I e  trends  In  pub  I I  c  f I nances,  tax  I ncr  eases  and  cost I y  wage 
agreements,  together  wIth  QUIte  al  ugg Ish  externa  I  dEmand  prospects,  are · 
adversely  affecting  expected  rates  of  return  on  new  Investment. 
ConseQuent 1  y,  1  f  reg I ona I  subsIdIes  are  to  have  the  des  I red  ef  feet  on 
Investment,  a  consistent  and  significant  package of  supply-side measures 
rrust  be  Introduced  to  prepare  the  ground  for  a  longer-term  dynsnlc 
Investment  performance  In  Garmany.  This  package  should  Include 
deregu  I at  I  on measures  (the report of the Deregu I at  I on Conn Iss  I on  In ear I y 
1990  contaIns  sever  a I  reI  evant  proposa Is> ,  a  sIgn  I f I cant  reduct I on  of 
sectoral  subsidies and  expenditure control  In  the public sector  to bring 
pub I I  c  f I nances  back  onto  a  hea  I thy  path.  In  add It  I on,  wage  moderat I  on 
In  the  public  sector  could  have  a  positive demonstration effect  on  wage 
agreements  In the private sector.  It must also be borne  In mind that any 
Investment  subsidy  In  West  Genmany  acts  as  a  disincentive to  Investment 
In East Germany. 
~re  at  tent I  on  shou I d  a I so  be  paId  to  the  potent  I a I I y  adverse 
repercussions  of  privatization  and  subsidization  In  East  Germany  on  the 
overall  level  of  competition  and  profitability  In  Genmany.21  The 
recent  stance of  economic policy  In  East  Germany  favours  large-scale and 
capital-Intensive  Investment,  which  Is coming mainly  from companies  that 
often already hold a  dOminant position on  the West  Genman  market.  This  Is 
true for alI  sectors,  e.g.  energy,  motor vehicles,  banking,  Insurance and 
retailing.  At  the  end  of  the  adjustment  process  In  East  Germany,  a 
completely refashioned economic structure with more ollgopollstlc markets 
and  1  ess  campet I t I  on  and  f I ex I b I I I ty may  have  emerged  In  Germany  as  a 
who 1  e,  In  pI  ace  of  an  economIc  structure  dan  I nated  by  0011)et I t 1  ve  and 
f 1  ex 1  b 1  e  sna I I  and med I un-s  I zed  enterpr I ses. 
F Ina  I I y,  the  IntegratIon  of  the  two  parts  of  Germany  reQUIres  enormous 
and  1  ong-1 ast  I ng  adjustments  In  behavIour  In  West  as  we I I  as  East 
Germany.  The  seat e  of the cha I I enge thIs poses to German  socIety demands 
21  See  also Fels/Schnabel  (1991). (5) 
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a  I  arge  measure  of  econan I  c  and  soc I  a I  consensus;  otherwIse,  the 
necessary  redistribution  In  favour  of  East  Gennany  may  result  In  severe 
and  counter  product I  ve  dIsputes.  The  Governrent,  oppos It ion,  enp I  oyers  · 
associations,  trade unions and all  other  Important  groups should  seek  to 
develop  a  social  pact  deriving  from  an  agreed  strategy  for  a  successful 
catching-up process  In  East Germany  without  endangering  social  stabl I lty 
22  In  Germany  as a  whole. 
22  See also  :  Commission  {1990),  Schmidt  (1992). 
More  detal led on  such a  strategy  :  Sinn/Sinn  (1991). -26-
II •  CHANGED  PATTERN  OF  THE  GERIIAN  ECONOIIY 
1.  Introduction 
German  unl f I cat ion  has  affected  the  macroeconanlc  performance  of  the 
German  econcmy,  as  regards  both  econan  I c  target  var I abIes  and  econon  I c 
poI I c I es.  The  change  In  econon  I c  performance w  I I I  undoubted I y  I nf  I uence 
the  European  econan  I c  I ntegrat  1  on  process.  Part  I I I  w  I I I  focus  on  these 
Issues.  This  part  Is  devoted  to a  discussion of  the  factors  which  were 
responsible  for  these changes and of the economic outlook.  In contrast to 
Part  I,  we  sha II  focus  here  on  the  performance  of  the  overa II  German 
econany  s 1  nee  i t  w 1  1  I  becane  Increasing  I y  I nappropr I ate  to  d 1st  i ngu Ish 
23  between  two  separate  econanles.  Indeed,  the  econanlc  Integration 
of  the  two  parts  of  Germany  has  moved  ext  rene  I y  fast  and,  In  sever  a I 
respects,  Integration  Is proceeding  further  than can  ever  be  expected  In 
Europe.  1. t  1  s  havIng  a  bear I ng  not  on I y  on  I nst  I tut  1  ona I  aspects,  e.g. 
the  tax  system,  but  also  on  economic  Interrelationships,  such  as 
labour~rket behaviour. 
Sect 1  on  2  1  dent I f i es  major  d I sequ I I I br I a  between  reg I ona I  danand  and 
supply  as  key  sources of  the economic  imbalance prevailing  In Germany  In 
the  aftermath  of  unification.  Ultimately,  all  the  economic  Implications 
of  un 1  f I cat  I on  are  traceab  I e  to  thIs  source  :  econan  I c  bcx:m  In  West 
Germany,  danger  of  accelerating  Inflation,  and  marked  swing  in  the 
current-account  balance.  The  change of  the overall  policy mix  in Genmany 
(Section  3)  has  been  considerably  Influenced  by  unification.  Initially, 
fiscal  pol Icy was  eased significantly as a  means of satisfying the demand 
of  those  I I vI  ng  In  East  Germany,  a  denand  that  had  been  suppressed  over 
decades  as  a  result of  supply shortages.  In order  to dampen  Inflationary 
dangers,  monetary  poI Icy  was  t I ghtened  so  I e I y  In  response  to  danest I c 
considerations.  Consequently,  there might  be a  conflict  between  domestic 
needs  and  external  requlrenents  In  the conduct  of monetary  policy.  And 
so,  1  n  order  to  reduce  econan  I c  straIns  In  Germany,  the  Issue  of 
redistribution must  be discussed  (5ectlon 4}. 
23  see also KrOger  (1991}. -27-
2  ~and  and supply dyna.lcs after unification 
We  saw  in  Part  I  that unification has rendered a  significant part of  the 
East  Genman  capital  stock  economically  obsolete.  This  concerns  not  only 
Industry,  where  it  is,  haNever,  rrost  obvious,  but  also  construction, 
agriculture and even services and  the public sector.  Not  only the capital 
stock  has  beccme  obso I  ete.  The  QUa I I ty of  1  abour  supp I  y  1  s  a 1  so  fa I 1  i ng 
to match  demand.  Thus  the eoonom I  c  potent I  a I  of  the  former  East Germany 
has been severe  I  y  reduced. 
2.1  The  regional  perspective 
Before monetary  union,  the desolate structure of  the East  Genman  economy 
- also relative to East Genman  demand  - had  been  hidden with the help of 
r i g i d  externa I  protect I  on  and  the  non-convert I  b I I I ty  of  the  on I  y  I  ega I 
tender  in  the hands  of  East German  residents.  However,  the poor  economic 
potent I  a I  of  the  former  East  Germany  has  been  brought  to  1  I  ght  by 
developments since unification:  production  In  Industry has col lapsed,  but 
without significantly  Improving  productivity. 
On  the  other  hand,  danest lc  demand,  suppressed  by  the  above-ment toned 
measures  for  decades,  was  bolstered  via a  very  generous conversion  rate 
for  financial  assets and  flows,  and  via generous  transfers  from· the West 
German  governnent,  although  these were  financed  by  borrONing  on  capital 
markets.  In  East Genmany,  a  revival  of potential  output based on existing 
production factors  Is severely constrained.  First,  demand  for  goods which 
can  be  produced  with  the existing capital  stock  Is  fairly  low  and  very 
price-Inelastic.  Second,  economically viable production wl  I I  reQuire very 
large  Increases  in  labour  productivity.  This means  that more capital  with 
lnsuff tclent  marginal  capital  and  labour  productivity  will  have  to  be 
scrapped.  Indeed,  In  order  to  survIve  In  a  market-orIented  econam I  c 
env I  rorment,  product 1  vI ty  has  to  approach  the West  German  I  eve I .  GIven 
the  ex 1st 1  ng  defIcIencIes,  on I  y  a  sma I I  proportIon  of  the  1  abour  force 
wl  II  be employed  In  the medium  tenn on  the basis of  the existing capital 
stock.
24 
24The  JAW  (1991)  has  estimated  that  only  1/4  of  the  (severely  reduced) 
t aboUr  force  w I 1  I  be  Efl'l) I  oyed,  gIven  the  exIst 1  ng  capIta  I  stock  after 
a  successful  catching-up process. -28-
AI  I  In alI,  the economically viable supply potential  of  East Germany  wi I I 
remain  low  for  the next  2-3 years,  even  If  large-scale private  investment 
mater I a I I zes.  On  the one  hand,  the adJustment  process  has  not  yet  been 
completed.  On  the other,  Investment  today wl II  boost supply only over  the 
medium  term.  This  concerns  not  only  Investment  In  physical  capital,  but 
a I so  Investment  In  hunan  capIta  I .  Therefore,  In  a  pos  I t I  ve  catchIng-up 
scenarIo,  aggregate  supp I y  w  I I I  rema 1  n  1  ow  reI at I ve  to  denand  In  East 
Genmany  untl 1  the mld-1990s. 
From  an  economic  and  supply-demand  point  of  view,  the  supply-demand  gap 
In  East  Germany  energed  Just  In  time  to  prevent  a  maJor  slowdaNn  of 
econantc  rn::mentun  In  West  Germany.  At  a  time  when  demand  In  major 
partner  countries  became  sluggish  and  West  German  export  buoyancy  -
evident  during  the  late  1980s  as  Investment  expanded  sharply  - faltered, 
West  German  supp I I ers  were  happy  to  serve  a  canp  I ete  I y  ne.v  market . 
Indeed,  West  German  producers were able to channel  a  significant part of 
their production to the East German  market  straightaway. 
The  persistent  supp I  y-danand  gap  in  East  Germany  w  I I I  probab I  y 
characterIze  Germany's  econan I  c  performance  for  QUIte  sane  tIme  and  It 
has  led  to  a  considerable  swing  In  the  German  current-account  balance. 
The  at I  German  trade surplus,  which  stOOd  at almost 6% of unified German 
GOP  In  1989,  was  reduced  to a  marginal  surplus of  10  bn  (0,75% of GOP)  In 
1991 .  Imports  soared  by  two  dIgIt  growth  rates  In  both  1990  and  1991 , 
25  reflecting  the  strong  demand  of  East  German  residents.  Not  only 
higher  Import  demand  but also stagnating exports  led to the deterioration 
In  the  current-account  ba  I ance.  Indeed,  as  capacIty  utI I I  zat  I on  rates 
moved  above  norma I  1  eve Is.  supp I y  bot  t I enecks  In  West  Germany  became more 
serious and  foreign orders were cut back. 
All  In  all,  It can  be  said  that  the West  German  current-account  surplus 
provided  the  real  resources  to  close  the  supply-denand  gap  in  East 
Gennany.  Taking  the trade balance of West  Gennany  alone,  there was  sti I I 
a  surplus equivalent to almost 7  % of GOP,  corresponding to the country's 
net exports to East Germany. 
25  For  more detai Is,  see Section  2  In  Part  I I 1. -29-
2.2  The  sectoral  perspective 
It  Is  evIdent  that  the  catchIng-up  process  In  the  East  German  econony 
lrrc:>lles  huge  annunts  of  Investment.  It  has  also  to  be  recognized  that 
modernIzatIon  of  exIstIng  enterpr I  ses  reQuIres  1  arge  21110Unts  of 
Investment  too.  FoiiONing  a  scenar lo  In  which  around  3~
26 of  the  net 
capital  stock  survives  and  In  which  the capital-output  ratio after  the 
catching-up process has been completed equals that  In  West  Gennany  (2.7), 
capital  reQuirements  would  amount  to around  OM  1.800 billion,  or  2/3  of 
present al l~nman GOP.  Assuming  that  50% of this  lnvesunent was  provided 
fran  external  sources,  the  current-account  deficit  would  widen  by  a 
further  3  1/2% of  GOP  If  the catching-up  process  Is assumed  to  last  ten 
years.  Higher  consuner  spending  would  contribute  to  a  larger  deficit 
until  the supply effect of  new  Investment  raised danestic output. 
While  the  considerable  decline  In  viable  supply  had  been  unavoidable 
given  the  three  "big  bangs"  associated with  Integrating  the  East  German 
econany  Into  the  over  a I I  German  and  Ccmnun 1  ty  econany,  the  purchasIng 
PONer  of  East  Gennan  residents  has  been  underpinned  by  several  factors. 
First,  the  favourable  conversion  rate  for  private-sector  savings  was  a 
once-and-for-all  "wealth  gl ft"  to  East  German  resluents;  second,  the 
rapid wage-adjustment  process  Implied  that  the consumption  wage  exceeded 
the  product  wage  consIstent  wIth  an  approprIate  I  eve I  of  enterprIse 
profltabl I lty.  Consequently,  enterprises rely on  I lqutdity credits which 
are  guaranteed  by  the  Treuhandansta I  t  and  w  I I 1  probab I  y  add  to  pub I I  c 
debt  later on.  This  Indirect  subsidization of wages  has  been  accompanied 
by  very  generous  shOrt-term  working  arrangements  and  by  artificial 
support  for  demand  via ex  post credit guarantees  In  particular vis-a-vis 
the  USSR.  Finally,  several  transfers  were  broadly  Indexed  to  wage 
developments or  even  adjusted ahead of wage  increases. 
The  disappearance of  the German  current-account  surplus corresponds  to a 
similar  decl lne  in  net  national  saving.  Seen  from  this angle,  the saving 
potential  remains  low  In  East Genmany. 
26  See  Poh 1  ( 1990} .  S lm I I  ar  mounts  of  capIta  I  needed  are  descrIbed  1  n 
Burda  ( 1990}  or  NeLmann  ( 1991).  The  IWF  has  est lmated  the  need  for  new 
cap 1  ta  1 at DM  2 000 bn.  See M::Dona I  d /Thunann  ( 1990} . -30-
The  persona I  saving  rat I  o  has  been  very  I  ON  as  d I  ssav I  ng  took  pI ace 
fo I I  ON I  ng  the  generous  conversIon  of  f I  nanc I  a I  assets  and  In  order  to 
satisfy  the considerable  pent-up  demand  for  consumer  durables.  Although 
personal  saving  w111  tend  to return  to  nonmal  levels,  not  least  becau~e 
of  the  uncertaIntIes  preva I I I  ng  on  the  I  abour  market,  It  w  I I i  remain 
below  the saving  ratio  In  West  Germany.  The  proportionately  larger  share 
of  transfer  lncanes  Is  one  explanatory  factor.  Given  favourable 
catch  1  ng-up  prospects,  consuner  demand  m  1  ght  r I  se  ahead  of  d I  sposab  1  e 
Income  according to the permanent-Income theory. 
COrporate  saving  wl  I I  remain  row  In  East  Germany  as profits continue  to 
be depressed,  Irrespective of more  favourable profit expectations  in  the 
med I  un  term,  wh I  ch  are  cruc  I  a I  I f  Investment  Is  to  be  encouraged . 
Investment  by  East German  enterprises wl  I I,  therefore,  lead  more or  less 
directly  to  a  greater  financial  deficit  In  this  sector.  Again.  In  a 
positive  catching-up  scenario,  the  financial  deficit  of  the  corporate 
sector would  be  larger  and  the current-account effect negative. 
F I  seal  policy consolldat I  on  will  prove  to be  a  major  challenge.  Leaving 
27  as  1  de  sIgn I f 1  cant  r 1  sks,  there  has  been  a  cons I  derab I  e  I  oosen I  ng  or 
fiscal  policy.  Although  official  estimates  of  the medlun-tenm  prospects 
for  publ lc  finances  are quite optimistic,  they depend  on  very  favourable 
assunpt Ions.  A  reduct I  on  In  the  budget  defIcIt  even  for  the  Feder  a I 
Government  alone  - the official  forecast  Is  for  a  reduction  frcnl  5%  of 
CDP  In  1991  to  2  1/2%  of  CDP  In  199528  -would  require  a  larger 
reduction  In  the  primary  deficit.  Taking  into  account  that  the 
debt-servIce  requ i renent  w  I I I  gro.v  by  about  2%  of  roP  over  the  per i od 
1991-95,  the  primary  deficit  of  0,1%  of  <DP  In  1991  would  have  to  be 
transformed  Into a  surplus equivalent to  2%  of GOP.  Since,  for  the time 
being,  transfers  to  East  Germany  account  for  most  of  the  public-sector 
deficit whl le  investment  incentives will  lead  to revenue shortfalls at a 
later date,  a  shift  In  expenditure away  frcnl  transfers wl  I I  also have  to 
be achieved.  Finally,  large-scale  Infrastructure  Investment wl  I I  require 
additional  public  funds. 
27  For more  detal Is,  see section 3.2. 
28  HoNever,  the  abso I  ute  reduct I  on  of  the  defIcit  is  quIte  sna i  1  s i nee, 
on  the  assunption  of  buoyant  nanlnal  <DP  gro.vth,  a  reduction  fran  5% 
to  2  1/2%  of  <?DP  translates  Into  an  absolute  reduction  fran  CM  120bn 
In  1991  to OM  90bn  in  1995. -31-
Fiscal  consolidation  will  prove  to  be  difficult,  regardless  of  the 
catching-up  scenar to.  A  positive  scenar lo  would  reQUIre  large-scale 
public  Infrastructure  Investment  as  the catalyst  for  private  Investment 
and  wou I  d  1  ead  to  revenue  short  fa I Is  because of  I  ncent I  ves  provIded  for 
pr lvate  Investment.  HaNever,  since  Sl'l)lcyment  would  be  rruch  higher  In 
this  scenar lo  than  In  the  QPposlte  case,  transfer  payments  {social 
security payments)  would  be much  lower.  In  an  unfavourable scenario,  the 
risks would  lie  In  the opposite direction:  While  Investment-related  net 
expenditure would  be  lower,  transfer  pa~nts  would  be higher.  Therefore, 
the publ lc-sector deficit would  remain  large  In  the medium  tenm. 
AI  I  In  alI,  the expected continuation of  a  current-account deficit seems 
to  be  consistent  with  the  analysis  of  sectoral  saving/investment 
prospects.  A larger deficit can be expected with a  favourable catching-up 
scenario. 
3.  l•pact  on  econo~~lc pol lcles 
3.1  Monetary  policy 
The  short-term  lmpl !cations  for  monetary  policy  arising  from  the 
converst.on  of  ostmarks  Into convertible 0-Marks  were  less dranatlc  than 
Initially feared by  both the Bundesbank  and  financial  markets.  The  latter 
were  very  scept  i ca  I  aboUt  the  success  of  the  econan I  c  IntegratIon 
approach.  lmnedlately  after  the  announcanent  of  monetary  union, 
long-tenm  interest rates  Jumped  by  150 basis points without any change  In 
economic  fundamentals.  Therefore,  to  a  very  large  extent,  the  Interest 
rate  Increase  mirrored  a  higher  risk  prenlun  for  the  0-Mark.  Interest 
rates  In  EMS  partner  countries  Increased  to  a  rn.JCh  lesser  extent.  In 
addition,  the Bundesbank  warned  against an  unduly  generous conversion of 
financial  stocks,  In  particular  savings  deposits of  private  households, 
wages  and  transfer  lnoames. 
The  conversion  operation  was  conducted  very  efficiently  by  the 
Bundesbank  and  the  Inflationary  lf11)11catlons  were  Initially  much  less 
significant  than  had  been  feared.  The  Inflationary  threat  stemming  from 
the  approach  chosen  for  1  ntegrat I  on  was  due  In  part I  cuI ar  to  the  wIde 
d 1  screpancy between  aggregate demand  and  supp I  y · In  Germany.  Such  a  danand -32-
surplus  normally  requires  a  real  appreciation of  the  domestic  currency, 
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the  D-Mark  .  A  rea I  apprec  I at  I on  can  be  brought  about  eIther  by  a 
nanlnat  appreciation  or  by  a  higher  rate  of  Inflation  than  In  other 
countries.  A  reatlgnnent  within  the  EMS  would  have  been  difficult  to 
ach I eve  as  I t  wou I d  have  dlmaged  the  cred  I b I I I ty  of  the 
stab Itt  ty-or tented  monetary  policy  of  the  EMS  countr les.  tloreover, 
monetary  tIghtenIng  In  the  EMS  and  an  Imp I I ed  apprecIatIon  of  European 
cur  rene  I es  vIs-a-vIs  the  do  I I ar  wou I d  have  reduced  gro.vth  prospects  In 
many  countries where the cyct leal  situation was  already quite vulnerable. 
HoNever,  despite  the  large  supply-demand  gap,  higher  Inflation  did  not 
Immediately material lze  In  the aftermath of unification.  Several  factors 
fact I ltated the necessary transfer of goods  and services to East Germany. 
First,  the  excess  demand  was  mainly  for  consumer  durables,  which  have  a 
hIgh  pr Ice  e I ast I cIty . and  the  Import  content  of  whIch  Is  very  I arge 
anyway.  Second,  Imports  to  Germany  were  fac  I I I tated  as  the  demand 
profl les were  as~trlc, I.e.  excess demand  In  (East)  Germany  and  excess 
supp I y  In  sane  partner  oountr I es.  ThIrd,  because  of  s I ugg Ish  gro.vth  1  n 
world  trade,  German  exporters  looked  to  the  East  German  market.  Fourth, 
add I t I ona I  demand  was  met  by  hIgher  product I on  In  West  Germany,  with 
norma I  capacity  ut  i I I zat I on  rates  poss I b I y  beIng  surpassed.  ThIs  a 1  so 
enab I ed  enterprIses  to  achIeve  short-term  productIvIty  gaIns.  Indeed, 
profit margins were  Increasing.  AI I  In alI,  developments  have  shdwn  that 
the European economies  have became more  Integrated,  reducing  the need  for 
real  exchange-rate movements  to shift resources  In  the event of  regional 
Imbalances  In supply and  demand. 
Although  the short-term  Implications have  not  been  as  great  as  initially 
expected,  monetary  poI Icy  has  to  face  sever  a I  cha  I I enges.  These  are 
associated first with the technical  aspects of conducting monetary pol Icy 
within  Its  new  framework,  second  with  economic  prospects  In  Genmany  and 
the  r 1  ght  pot icy  mix,  and  thIrd  wl th  the  monetary  lmpllcat  Ions  of  a 
distributional  struggle between  the various economic agents  In Germany. 
29  See  on  this  e.g.  Wyplosz  (1991),  who  also  draws  attention  to  the 
divergence  between  short-term  and  long-term  considerations.  See  also 
Adams/Aiexander/Gaynon  (1992). (6) 
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The  more  technical  aspects  concern  the  diminished  validity of  monetary 
targets as  lntenmedlate  Indicators of monetary policy.  The conversion of 
ostmarks  Into 0-Marks has created a  monetary overhang.  Col1:>ared  to the 7% 
share of  the East  German  eoonany  In overall  German  <DP,  the money  stock 
M3  I ncr  eased  by  around  20J(,.  HoNever,  trueh  of  thIs  dIsproportIonate  I y 
I arge  I ncr  ease  ref I ected  a  strong  I I QUId I ty  preference  on  the  part  of 
East  German  res  1  dents.  It  can  thus  be  expected  that  non-monetary 
f inane Ia  I  aggregates  will  graN  at  a  disproportionately  strong  rate, 
reducing  the  broad  money  stock.  Therefore,  the monetary  overhang  should 
not  necessar I 1  y  feed  through  Into  expendIture.  Never  the  I ess, 
Interpretation of monetary  aggregates  based  on  changes  In behaviour will 
prove more difficult than  In the past.  The  Bundesbank  wl 1  I  have to aim at 
lower  growth  In monetary aggregates  In view of the  I lkely  Increase  In the 
velocity of circulation of  (broad)  money  In East Germany. 
Econantcally  more  1111J()rtant  Is  the  Issue  of  responding  to  dl fferent 
econan I c  scenar i os  In  East  Germany,  and  a  posIt  I ve  catchIng-up  scenar I o 
In  East  Germany  cou I d  be  based  eIther  on  I arge  pub I I c-sector  Investment 
and  transfers  or  on  private-sector  lnves'bnent  In  response  to  positive 
expectations  there.  In  both  cases,  the  supply-denand  gap  would  widen, 
necessitating  a  larger  transfer  of  real  resources  to  East  Genmany,  and 
this  in turn would  produce a  larger current-account deficit. 
If  Investment consisted primarily of publ lc  Investment  In  Infrastructure, 
w I th  pr I vate  I nvesbnent  rena In  I ng  subdued  at  I east  dur I ng  the 
short-to~lum  term,  the  publ lc-sector  deficit  would  be  large.  As 
Imports  of  such  goods  would  be  CO'fl)aratlvely  low,  the  current-account 
deficit might  remain  rrodest.  HoNever,  Inflationary  dangers  would  arise 
from  lopsided sectoral  developments,  I.e.  strong price and wage  pressures 
in  the  construct ion  sector,  perhaps  acx:ar()anled  by  similar  develor;ments 
in  other  sectors  as  a  result  of  an  lntersectoral  wage-denonstratlon 
ef  feet,  and  mounting  tax  pressures  because  of  the  need  to  canso  I I date 
public  f 1  nances. 
In  the case of positive private-sector  expectations  and  high  Investment, 
pressure  on  the  public-sector  balance  would  be  much  reduced,  but  the 
current-account  deficit  might  turn  out  to  be  larger.  Inflationary 
pressures would be  fuelled by a  persistently  large supply-demand  gap,  not 
only  tor  investment  goods  but  also  for  consumer  goods  because  of  more -34-
favourable  Income  expectations and multlpl ler effects.  In  both scenarios, 
a  tIght  roc>netary  po  1 Icy  stance  wou 1  d  rena In  necessary  1  n  Germany  for 
danest I c  reasons.  ~reover  ,  In  the  second  scenar I o,  rronetary  cond i t  Ions 
would  prove to be  tighter  because external  capital  Inflows would  tend  to 
push  up  the OYMark  while,  in  the first scenario,  the trend of  the  D~rk 
would  depend on  the degree of monetary  tightening. 
The  thIrd  scenarIo,  character I  zed  by  no  catchIng-up  process  in  East 
Germany,  wou I  d  enta I I  I  arge  transfer  pa~nts  to  the  East  German 
population.  As  In  the case of  the Mezzoglorno,  the public-sector deficit 
would  turn out  to  be  QUite  large  and  the structure of  expenditure would 
be much  worse than  in  the first scenario.  However,  as  lnvesbnent would  be 
much  I  ONer  than  1  n  the  two  opt  1  ona I  scenar 1  os,  the  1mpl ied 
current-account deficit would  be modest.  Moreover,  Inflationary pressures 
would  be  mitigated  by  growing  labour~rket  Integration,  t .e.  high 
unemplo~nt  In  the  East  wl II  have  Implications  for  wage  settlements  in 
Germany  as a  whole.  Such  a  scenario wil I  render monetary  tightening much 
Box  3  :  Monetary  implications of different developments  in  East Gennany 
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I ess  necessary.  HaNever,  the  0-Mark  wou I d  be  weakPr  than  In  t.he  other 
two  scenarios. 
All  in  all,  given  the  likely  developnents  in  Germany,  tight  monetary 
conditions will  have  to prevail  over  the coming  years either  because of 
the shift  In  fiscal  policy  towards a  more  expansionary stance or  because 
of  a  favourable  catching-up  process  tr  lggered  by  pr lvate-sector 
expend t ture.  On I y  In  the  worst-case  scenar I  o  of  no  catchIng-up  mIght 
monetary oondltons be  less tight. 
3.2  Fiscal  policy 
In  1990  German  public  finance  departed  fran  the  path  of  fiscal 
consol idatlon on  which  It  had  embarked  In  1982.  It  Is Genman  unification 
In  particular  that  led  to a  major  relaxation  of  fiscal  policy although, 
irrespective  of  that  historic  event,  a  loosening  or  fiscal  pol icy  had 
been  planned  for  early  1990  with  the  Introduction of  the  third  stage of 
the  1986-88-90  tax  refonm  In  West  Germany,  producing  revenue shortfal Is 
equlv~lent to same  1%  of West  Germany's  GOP.  The  further  shift  in  fiscal 
pol Icy was  prompted  by  several  factors.  Firstly,  the as~tric  exchange 
rate for Ostmark  assets and  I labll ltles  led directly to additional  publ lc 
debt  (equalization  claims)  of  about  DM  30bn  and  to  an  Initial 
supply-demand  gap.  Secondly,  the  very  generous  conversion  rate  for  the 
Ostmark  led  to  high  expenditure  as  East  German  transfer  payments  and 
salaries  In  the public sector were  not  covered  by  corresponding  revenue. 
Thirdly,  several  Investment  subsidies  and  tax  exeTl)tlons  designed  to 
foster  investment  In  East Germany  widened  the gap  between  public  revenue 
and  expenditure.  Fourthly,  the  Increase  In  publ lc-sector salaries  In  West 
Gennany  was  unexpectedly  large  In  late  1990/early  1991  - perhaps 
influenced by  the general  election  In  December  1990.  This generous salary 
Increase added  significantly to  Inflationary  (wage-oost)  pressure  In  West 
Germany. 
Finally.  a  kind  of  "grONth  Illusion"  In  West  Germany  also  led  to  an 
expend 1  ture  spree  In  West  German  pub I lc  budgets.  SoarIng  grONth  and 
revenues  were  deemed  to  be  susta  I  nab I  e  and  were  seen  as  the  resu I  t  of 
successful  supply-side  policy.  It  was  not  recognized  - at  least  not 
Immediately - that dynamic  growth  In  West  Germany  was only the other side ' 
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of  the  coIn  of  the  econan  I  c  s IUT1)  In  East  Germany.  ConseQUent I y,  the 
extra revenue  In West  Germany was  no more  than  recyc  I eel  transfer  pa~nts 
fran East Germany  financed by borra.vlng on capital  markets. 
All  In  all,  f I seal  policy  In  Germany  switched  fran  a  healthy  and 
sustainable  consolidation  path with  beneficial  supply-side effects  to  a 
pattern characterized  by  large  Imbalances  In  East  Genmany,  by  something 
of  spendIng  spree  t n  West  Germany,  by  an  I ncr  ease  In marg Ina  I  tax  rates 
with detrimental  supply-side effects and  by  a  narra.vtng  In the  tax  base. 
The  swIng  In  the  pub I I c-sector  ba I ance  has  been  as  I arge  as  5%  of  CDP. 
However,  one  has  to distinguish careful IY between  the different  levels of 
government. 
Federal  Government 
In  the  aftermath  of  unification,  the  Federal  Government  budget  in 
particular  had  been  affected.  The  Increase  In the deficit  from  around  OM 
36bn  In  1989  to  Dv1  68bn  In  1990  was  due  maIn I y  to  the  acceptance  of 
responslbll lty for  the public-sector deficit of the GDR  (about  OM  20 bn) 
In  the  second  ha 1  f  of  1990.  30  M:>reover ,  after  the  open 1  ng-up  of  the 
Internal  border,  transfer  pa~nts were  made  to  East  Genman  residents. 
OUr I ng  1991  the  Feder  a I  Goverrment  budget  def i c I t  (  Dv1  52  bn)  was 
actua  I I y  reduced  in  Quant I tat  I ve  terms.  In  Qua I I tat  I ve  terms,  haNever , 
the  deficit  was  now  attributable  to  measures  In  support  of  the 
catchIng-up  prc:x:ess  In  East  Germany  ( Econan  I  c  Rev Iva  I  Programne)  and, 
more  Important 1  y,  to  the  f I nanc I a I  support  for  transfer  pa~nts,  In 
particular  those  aimed  at  safeguarding  a  high  level  of  enployment. 
Furthermore,  hIgher  expendItures  were  a I so  fInanced  by  hIgher  revenue, 
following several  Increases  In direct and  Indirect  taxes. 
In  future,  sever  a I  r I sks  are  assocI  a ted  wIth  the  prospects  for  the 
Federal  Goverrment  budget.  On  the  revenue  side,  lONer-than-expected 
gra.vth  could  make  for  a  lONer  outturn  than  that  anticipated  In  the 
medlum-tenm  plan.  In  addition,  revenue  will  be  Influenced  by  the 
Investment  I ncent I ves  ava  I I ab I e  In  the  form  of  tax  a I I  a.vances.  These 
will  reduce  the  tax bill  of  enterprises  significantly  from  1992  onwards 
30  To  a  lesser  extent,  It was  due  to  the  above-mentioned  lncane  tax  cuts 
In  West  Germany,  whIch  had  been  a I ready  decIded  upon  before  the 
changes  In East Germany. (7) 
-37-
If  private  lnvesbment  picks up.  On  the expenditure side,  risks arise from 
the  need  to  take  over  (part  of)  East  Germany's  debt,  part I  cuI ar I  y  as 
regards  the  Treuhandanstalt.  Not  only  Is  the  Treuhandanstalt  running  a 
gro.vlng  def lclt  In  respect  of  Its  current  activities,  but  It  has  also 
granted  large amounts of  liQUidity credits to enterprises which might  not 
be  paId  back.  tloreover ,  the  former  debt  of  enterpr I  ses  has,  to  a  I  arge 
extent,  been  taken  over  by  the  Treuhandansta It  where  the  enterpr I  ses 
concerned  have  been  privatized.  This  Is  the  price  that  has  to  be  paid 
for  the  generous. conversion  rate  for  Ostmark  assets,  which  Is  harming 
ex I st  I  ng  enterpr I  ses  and  pUSh lng  than  Into  bankruptcy.  Assun I  ng 
responsibility  for  obligations  In  the area of  environmental  damage  adds 
to the  financial  risks.  The  budgetary  prospects  for  the Treuhandanstalt 
are also gloomier  as a  result of  the privatization process  Itself.  As  It 
w  I I I  beccrne  1  ncreas  1  ng 1  y  d 1  f f I  cu  1  t  to  generate  revenue  by  se  I I I  ng 
enterpr I  ses,  no  expend I  ture-ba I  anc I  ng  I  terns  w  I I I  appear  In  the  ba I  ance 
sheet  of  the  Treuhandansta It .  I  f ,  I  n  the  m  I  d-1990s,  the  debt  of  the 
Treuhandanstalt  becomes  genuine  publ lc debt,  the  Interest-rate burden  of 
the Federal  Government  might  be uneased  by  at  least  0.~ of  CJJP  assunlng 
that  50%  of  the  accumulated  debt  are  taken  over  by  the  Federal 
Government. 
Indirect  subsidies  for  German  enterprises might  also affect  the Federal 
Government  budget.  During  1991  large amounts  of  export...credlt  guarantees 
were granted by  the publ lcly owned  Hermes  Credit  Insurance COmpany.  Since 
these credits,  In  particular  those  for  the USSR,  will  very  likely not  be 
paid  back,  Hermes  w  I I I  probab I  y  make  sIgn I  f I  cant  I  osses  In  the  years 
ahead.  Further  r I  sks  whIch  cannot  be  accurate  I  y  Quant If I  ec::t  arIse  In 
connection with  the restitution of what  was  previously private property, 
with  attempts  to  balance  the  books  of  the  social  security  systen,  with 
any  reduction  In  the taxation of basic  Income,  etc. 
Lander 
As  regards  the  budget  s 1  tuat I  on  of  the  Uincter,  one  has  to  d I st  I  ngu 1  sh 
between  the West  German  Lander  and  the East German  Uinder .  As  regards the 
former,  dIrect  short-term  f I  nanc I  a I  rIsks  sternn I  ng  from  German 
unification are  I lmlted as the German  Uhlty Fund  covers the major  risks, 
which  were  (del lberately)  taken over  by  the Federal  Government.  The  West 
German  Lander  wll 1 contribute to the German  Unity  Fund  to the tune of  CM -38-
57,  5  bn  unt  I 1  1994.  I f  one  takes  I nto  aCXXlUnt  the  Interest  charges  1  n 
respect  of  the  1  rrp I I ed  debt-serv  I  c I ng  reQU I rement •  expend I ture  I ncr  eases 
by  around  1,5%.  Indirect  effects,  e.g.  In  relation  to  corporation  tax 
receIpts.  shou I d  not,  haNever,  be under  est  I  mated  as  d I rect  I nves'bnent  In 
loss-making  affiliates  In  East  Germany  will  reduce  the  corporation  tax 
payable by parent  companies  registered  In west  Germany.  Furthenmore,  the 
s I tuat  I on  w I I I  becane  more  cr It  I ca  I  In  the  med I un  term  when  the  East 
German  Linder  participate  In  the  financial  equalization  mechanlsn 
(Finanzausglelch).  Assuming  that  from  1995 onwards  they participate fully 
In  the  systan,  the  I oss  In  revenue or  hIgher  pa}111eflts  Into the mechan I sn 
w I 1  I  srount  to a I  most  10 "  of  the  expendIture of  the west  German  Uinc:ler 
(see box). 
The  East  German  Lander  wl II  face  a  growing mlsnatch  between  revenue  and 
expendIture.  TheIr  own  f I nanc  I a I  resources  w I I I  rena In  I lm I ted  as  tax 
revenue accruing  from economic activities  In East Germany wl I I  be  low.  In 
part leu  I ar,  corporatIon  tax  receIpts  w I I I  probab I y  rena In  neg I I g I b I e 
during most  of  the  1990s.  As  regards other direct taxes,  there will  be a 
trade-off  between  the wage  level  and  the  level  of  unemplo~nt. Although 
a  rapid  catching-up  of  wages  might  Increase  tax  revenue  per  el11liOYed 
taxpayer ,  the  nurber  of  taxpayers  w I I I  be  reduced  as  a  resu I t  of  job 
losses.  M:>reover,  In  the  likely  scenar lo  of  rapid  wage  eQUalIzatIon, 
goverrment  consunpt I on  wou I d  be  d 1  rect  1  y  a f fectec:t  s 1  nee  sane  35%  of 
Linder  expendIture  Is  accounted  for  by  wages.  Therefore,  the  on I y 
QUant 1  tat  1  ve  1  y  lfl1)0rtant  source  of  tax  revenue  for  the  East  German 
Linder wou I d  be  I nd I rect  taxes. 
However,  since the purchasing  power  of East  German  residents will  remain 
sIgn  1  f I cant I y  be  I ow  that  of  theIr  West  German  counterparts  and  s I nee 
expenditure  might  be  skewed  tcwards  lower-taxed  goods,  this  source  of 
31  revenue  mIght  not  be  as  product I ve  as  In  West  Germany.  F Ina  I I y, 
hIgh  expendIture  w 1  1  I  a I so  resu It  fran  var I ous  other  factors:  major 
Investment  In  Infrastructure,  high  transfers  to  ocmpensate  for  rapidly 
rIsing aCXXJmodat I on costs,  etc. 
31  In  West  Germany,  VAT  1  s  shared  on  a  reg I ona I  bas 1  s.  by  reference  to 
popu 1  at  I on,  and  not  by  reference  to  the  rea  I  reg I ona I  tax  base.  1  n 
1991  the  West  German  Linder  agreed  to  a I I ow  the  ne.v  Uinder  to 
participate  In  this  arrangement  even  though  the  Unification  Treaty 
ruled this out. -39-
Box  4  :  Incorporating  the  five  new  Lander  In  the Weat  German  revenue-ahorlng  syatem 
I.  The  working  of  the Weet  Gennan  revenue-eharlng eyet .. (Finanzaueglelch) 
The  West  German  Interregional  redlatrlbutlon  ayatem,  not  Including  eociol  eecurlty  (which  by  the 
way.  is  aignlflcontly  more  Important  In  thla  reepect),  conalste  of  three  elements  :  (I)  tax 
shoring,  (if)  horizontal  revenue  aharlng  and  (Ill)  vertical  revenue  sharing.  In  the  end,  every 
I  nd I  vi duo I  Land •  1  f I  sea I  capac lty  ahou I  d  reach  95  to  97X  of  the  ave rage  f taco I  capacIty.  The 
boats  for  (the  acceptance  of)  thla  eyetem  are  ld•ntical  tax  rulea  in  the  whole  territory,  I.e. 
there  exiats  no  room  for  regional  differentiation  In  taxea  and  tax  ratea  with  the  exception  of 
the  local  trade  tax. 
(I)  Tax  eharlng  (wage  and  Income  tax.  corporation  tax and  VAT) 
Joint  or  ahored  taxea  cover  all  of  the  moat  Important  revenue  aourcee  In  Germany,  yielding 
approximately  three quarter• of  total  tax  revenuea.  Theae  taxea are shored among  the Federal,  the 
Lander  and  the  local  level  as  followa:  42,5X,  42,5X  and  151  for  personal  income  tax,  501,  501, 
~for the  corporate  tax  and  G5X,  351,  01  for  VAT.  In  addition  to  the wage  and.personol  Income 
tax.  the  corporation  tax  and  the  VAT  the  local  trade  tax  Ia  oleo  ahared  by  all  three  levela  of 
government- although  it  Ia  not  officially a  joint  tax. 
The  regional  distribution  of  income  taxes  follows  the  regional  pattern  of  tax yields  (according 
to  the  residence principle with  special  rules  for  the  apportionment  of  the  corporation  tax).  The 
regional  distribution  of  VAT  is  essentially  on  a  per  capita  basis  (which  imp I ies  an  impl iclt 
equalisation effect).  However,  in  on  advanced  allocation  of  VAT  revenues  up  to 25X  of  the  Lander 
shore  of  VAT  (Erganzungsontell)  con  be  used  to  Increase  the  fiscal  capacity  of  poorer  Lander  to 
92X  of  the  average  indicator  (Steuerkraftme~zahl).  In  1990,  only  2,GX ·of  the  Lander  shore  (i.e. 
OW  1,3 bn,  repreaenting 0,081 of West  German  GOP)  woe  needed  to  reach  thl1 goal. 
(li)  Horizontal  revenue  aharlng  (Finonzauaglelch) 
In  a  second-round  redistribution process,  revenue-weak  Lander  get  additional  revenues  from  other 
Lander  if  their  Individual  fiscal-capacity  Indicator  (Finonzkroftme,Bzahl)  Ia  below  95X  of  a 
normative  fiscal-need  indicator  (Autglelchsme~zohl).  The  fitcol-copoclty  indicator  measures 
octuo I  revenue•  from  a  I I st  of  toxe1  a II  Lander  have  In  conmon.  It  11  odjuated  for  spec I  a I 
burdens  of  some  Lander.  The  fiscal-need  Indicator  calculate•  nonnative  tax-revenue•  of  an 
individual  Land  by  taking  Into account  alao urban-density  factora.  Conaequently,  every  individual 
Land's  tax-revenues  reach  at  leo1t  95X  of  the  average  fiscal-capacity  Indicator.  In  1990, 
horizontal  revenues  sharing amounted  to  OM  4  bn,  0,17X  of  Weat  German  GOP. 
(iii) Vertical  revenue  sharing (Erganzungazuweleung) 
Through  a  vertical  revenue  shoring  ayatem,  the  Federal  Government  is  allowed  to  redistribute  up 
to  2X  of  its  own  VAT-revenues  for  uncondi t ionol  aaynmetri co I  vert I  cal  granta-in-aid 
(Erganzungszuweiaungen)  to  those Lander  whose  revenuea  are still conaidered  to be  insufficient  to 
meet  their  public  expenditure  obligations.  In  1990,  vertical  revenue  aharing  reached  OW  3  bn, 
0,12X  of  West  German  GOP. 
Vertical  and  horizontal  revenue  shoring  11  not  very  important  from  a  macroeconomic  point  of  view 
and  when  compared  to  total  revenues  of  the  aggregated  Lander  level.  However,  it  Is  essential  for 
certain Lander  (e.g.  about  1~ of  all  revenues  of  the Saarland). 
(iv)  Other vertical  grants 
In  ad~ition  to  (Iii)  the  Federal  Government  Ia  involved  In  aeveral  other  osynmetricol  vertical 
grant  schemes,  which  ore,  however,  conditional  grants  and  often  subject  to  additional ity.  So 
these  aystems  could  be  compared  with  the  atructural  fundi  of  the  EC.  In  1990,  these  vertical 
grant  schemes  reached  OM  11,5 bn.  0,48X  of  Weat  German  GOP. 
Weet  Berlin was  not  covered  by  the  automatic  revenue  sharing systems.  In  the post.  there  existed 
a  special  vertical  scheme  between  the .Federal  Government  and  West  Bert in.  In  1990,  the  net  cost 
for  the  Federal  Budget  reached  OM  15,5'bn or 0,65X  of  West  German  GOP,  greater  than  the  total  of 
OM  8,3 bn,  involved  in  vertical  and  horizontal  revenue  aharlng  in  Weat  Germany. 
The  five  new  Lander  are  excluded  from  the  vertical  and  horizontal  revenue  sharing  system 
described above,  as  the  Involved  automatic  transfer• have  not  been  politically feasible.  Instead, 
aeverol  lump-aum  funds  were  launched  to arrive at  the  neceeeory  transfer of  financial  re1ources. 
The  whol.e  system  wi II  be  subject  to  a  major  revision  before  1995,  taking  into  account  larger 
discrepancies  In  per-capita GOP  between  weatern  and  eaatern Lander. Box  4  (continuation) 
11.  Incorporating the five n ..  Llnder1 
Ass!II!Ptl ons 
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The  five  new  Lander  are treated as one  n ..  Land.  Eaat Berlin  Ia  treated as a  part of  Berlin,  i.e. 
the  nuner  of  Inhabitants  Is  multiplied  by  1,35  according  to  the  definition  of  the  fiscal-need 
indicator.  As  no  rei ioble  data  exlat  aa  regarda  tax  revenuea  per  head  following  ossunptlons 
underly  the simulation  (in X of Weat  Gennon  level)  : 
Income  tax,  corporate  tax,  local  trade tax  :  201, 
VAT  :  SOX, 
Lander  taxes  :  301, 
Local  taxes  :  201. 
The  simulation  does  not  deal  with  Issues  related  to  the  split  of  Income  tax,  corporate  tax and 
VAT  according  to populations etc.  The  population  of  East  and  West  Berlin  Is set at  3,4 million, 
the  population  of  the  new  Lander  Is  aaaumed  to  be  14,i million.  The  figures  of  1990  hove  been 
token  for  the West  Gennon  Lander. 
Results 
The  amount  transfer  among  the  Lander  Increases  from  OM  5,4  bn  (0.2X  of  West  Gennon  GOP)  to  OM 
27,9  bn  (1.2X  of  unified Gennon  GOP).  OM  9,2  bn  ore  transferred  in  the  context  of  the  advanced 
allocation  of  VAT  revenues  (see  (1)),  OM  18,7  bn  ore  transferred  In  the  process  of  horizontal 
revenue  shoring  (see  (ii)).  Not  considering  special  guarantee  clauses,  almost  the  total  amount 
(99,2X)  is transferred to Berlin and  the new  Lander,  only Bremen  and  the Saarland  receive minimal 
amounts. 
Transfer payments  (-)  and  receipts (+)  after  Incorporating  the  five  new  LGnder(•) 
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(•)  Not  taking  fnto account  guaranty clouaes of  12 and  I  10,3 Finonzousgleichsgesetz. 
Source  :  Fuest/Lichtblou  (1991) 
Some  qualifications hove  to be  mode  now: 
(1)  By  limiting  the  shore of  VAT  reaerved  for  on  advanced  allocation  to 251,  fiscal  capacity of 
the  new  Lander  con  only  be  boosted  from  281  to~  of  the  overage  fiscal  capacity  of  all 
LGnder,  significantly  less  than  the  ratio of  i2X,  required according  to the  low. 
(2)  By  applying  only  the  redistributive  tariff  of  the  low,  some  inverse  results  occur,  i.e. 
revenue-weak  Lander  hove  to  pay.  Furthennore,  transfer  quotas  (defined  as  the  omount 
transferred  divided  by  the  amount  exceeding  the  overage  fiscal  capacity)  exceed  1001  in 
some  cases,  pushing  revenue-strong LGnder  below  the overage  in  unified Gennony. 
The  simulation  Is  token  from  Fuest/Lichtblou (1991). 
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Box  4  (continuation) 
According  to  the  different  guaranty  clouaea  of  the  Finonzouaglelchsgeaetz  tronafers  of  revenue 
strong Lander  shall  not  push  these L4ndera•  revenue  capacity below  the overage.  In  applying  these 
guaranty  clauses  and  In  taking  Into  account  olao  vertical  revenue-ahorlng  transfers  by  the 
F  ede ra I  I  eve I  (E rgllnzungazuwe laungen.  aee  (I I I))  the  rei at I  ve  poal t I  on  of  the  different  Lander 
changes  as  shown  in  the  following  table: 









Relative  revenue  capacity of  the Lander 
before and  after horizontal  and  vertical  revenue  shoring(•) 
- In  X of  overage  fiscal-need  Indicator-




























New  Llinder 
(•)  Transfers  include  advanced  allocation  of  VAT  revenues  (Er90nzungsantell),  horizontal 
revenue  shoring  (Finonzausgleich)  and  vertical  revenue  shoring  (Erg4nzungszuweisungen). 
Source  :  Fuest/lic~tblo~ (1991) 
AI I  in alI, although the East Gennan  Lander wl I I  start with a  comfortable 
level  of  debt,  theIr  def lc  Its will,  by  the mld-19905,  be  very  large  and 
the  level  of  debt will  probably  exceed  the average  level  of West  German 
debt.  Furthermore.  the  f Ina  I  ba  I ance  sheet  as  regards  the  "o  1  d  burdens" 
inherited  from  the  social 1st  system  and  the  debt  taken  on  by  the 
Treuhandansta It  w i I I  be  shared  between  the  Feder  a I  Goverrment  and  the 
five new  Lander.  adding significantly to the  latter's  Indebtedness. 
In  Germany  the  local  authorities  are  responsible  for  a  large  part  of 
publ lc  Investment  (around  65%).  Since there  Is a  particular need  for  such 
investment  In  East  Germany,  there  seens  to  be  no  upper  limit  on  the 
amount  whIch  cou I d  be  devoted  to  It  as  a  matter  of  prIor  I ty.  Leaving 
aside obvious absorption  problems  (see part  I,  section 3),  the requisite 
f I nanc I a I  r-esources  w I I I  depend  on  d I scret  I onary  decIsIons  made 
elsewhere.  Indeed,  almost  no own  financial  resources wl I I  be aval lable to 
local  authorities  in  .East  Germany.  The  local  trade  and  Industry  taxes -42-
(Gewerbeertrag- und  Gewerbekap Ita  1  steuer)  w I 1  1  not  be  ava  I I ab  1  e  as  a 
source  of  revenue  for  East  German  I oca  1  author it  I es.  I f  anythIng) 
I nves'bnent  w  I I I  have  to  be  attracted  by  prov  1  d 1  ng  I  oca  I  I ncent 1  ves  In 
order  to survIve  I n  the oc::J11)et It  1  on  for  I nvestment  w I th other  potent  I a 1 
product  I on  I ocat Ions.  Therefore,  a I though  a  generous  prov  1  s I on  of 
financial  funds  to  local  authorities would  be most  desirable  In order  to 
stlrrulate  public  lnves'bnent,  financial  constraints  at  other  tiers  of 
government might prevent this. 
Social  security system 
The  social  security  system will  face  large  Imbalances.  As  recipients of 
social  benefIts  normally  have  a  ICM  saving  rat lo,  higher  transfer 
pa~nts w  I I I  have  an  expansIonary  ef  feet  even  1  f  they  are  covered  by 
h I gher  oontr  I but Ions.  The  clef I  c I t  of  the  soc  I a I  secur I ty  system  w  I 1  1 
cm:x.Jnt  to  around  D.1  20bn  In  1992.  As  th  1  s  def  1  cIt  w I I I  be  f I nancec:t 
maIn I y  out of  f I nanc  I a I  assets  aocuru I a ted  In West  Germany  In  the past, 
the  expansIonary  ef  feet  w  I I I  prove  sIgn  I f I cant .  D I f f I cuI tIes  are  I Ike  I y 
to persIst over  the mec:l h.m  term  In a I I  f I e Ids of soc  I a I  secur I ty. 
As  regards  pens Ions,  IncorporatIon  of  the  East  German  schene  1  nto  the 
genera  I  West  German  schene  s I nee  January  1992  w I I I  I ead  to  add It  I ona I 
pa~nts of  around  D.1  10  bn.  32  Moreover,  as  wages  are  expected  to 
catch  up  rapidly with  those  In  West  Germany,  East  German  pensions will 
Increase  rapidly  too.  Given  the  relatively  high  level  of  labour~rket 
participation  In  East  Germany,  there will  be  a  rather  adverse  ratio of 
those  eligible  for  benefits  and  those  paying  contributions.  This  ratio 
might even deteriorate further  If early retirement  schemes  are  Introduced 
to alleviate the problem of mass  unenplo~nt In East Germany. 
As  regards  Unetl> I  o~nt benef Its,  the  sane  dyNm  I cs  mIght  app  t y.  In 
addition,  wage  adjustment  will  also  have  consequences  for  the  level  of 
unEIT1)1 o:yment  benef Its.  Moreover,  the  reservatI  on  wages  of  those  workers 
who  are  undergo  1  ng  traInIng  or  are  on  spec  I a I  EIT1)1 o~nt  schenes 
(secondary  labour market) will  lnl)Ose  a  heavy  burden  on  the  un~lo~nt 
Insurance scheme. 
32  See  Bundesbank,  Monthly Report,  f\bvember  1991. 
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Spec I  a I  r I  sks  ar I  se  In  connect I  on  wIth  hea I  th  Insurance.  f'bt  on I  y  the 
adJustment  of  the wage  level  but also the  likely adjustment of  the wage 
structure will  significantly  affect  expenditure  on  health  Insurance  In 
the  absence  of  market-based  checks  and  ba I  ances.  M:>reover ,  I  nsta I I I  ng 
rrodern  eQU i  J,lllent  1  n  hosp Ita  Is  w  I I I  I  ncr  ease costs  drernat lea I I  y  for  the 
scme  reason.  1-bNever,  revenue,  which  depends exclusively on  the wage  and 
sa I  ary  b I I I ,  w  i I I  gro.v  at  a  rruch  rrore  modest  rate  s I  nee  the  I  eve  I  of 
gross wages and salaries wl I 1  remain  relatively  low. 
Special  funds 
over  and  above  the  financial  Imbalances  In  general  government,  Including 
the  social  security  system,  special  funds  have  been  created  to  provide 
financial  resources  for  East Gennany  or  to cover  financial  risks arising 
from  the privatization and  reconstruction of  the East Gennan  eoo~  and 
in  cases where a  final  decision on  burden sharing has not yet been  taken. 
The  German  Unity  Fund  was  envisaged  as  providing  financial  resources of 
the order  of  rM  1  15bn  per  year  unt I I  1994.  However ,  by  the end of  1992 
the debt wl  I I  already amount  to OM  75bn.  Therefore,  In  order  to provide 
adeQuate  financial  resources  for  the  East  Genman  Linder  and  local 
authorities,  an  increase  of  VAT  rates  was  adopted  In  early  1992.  The 
resulting  revenues wl I I  help to finance the outlays of the Fund. 
The  Treuhandanstalt wl  I I  have  a  cumulated  debt of around  CM  150bn  by  the 
end  of  1992.  Prospects  are  very  g I  oc:my  as  pr I  vat I  zat I  on  w  I I I  progress 
only  If  responslbl 1 lty  Is assumed  for more  and more  financial  llabll ltles 
so  that  the  many  remaining  enterpr lses  can  be  so.ld  (given  away).  The 
bor·rONing  limits  for  the Treuhandanstalt,  Initially set at CM  10bn,  were 
thus  raIsed  to  CM  30bn  a  year .  In  add It I  on,  the  Treuhandansta It  w  I I I 
have  to take over old and  newly  accumulated corporate debt  If enterprises 
go  bankrupt.  ThIs  may  happen  rrore  and  rrore  often  s I  nee · the  econan I  c 
future of many  enterprises  Is very uncertain. 
AI  I  In  alI,  the debt  level  of those funds which are not directly  Included 
In  the Federal  and  the Lander  budgets may  amount  to same  CM  450bn  (15%  of 
GJP)  by  the  end  of  1994.  The  fo  1 I  ON I  ng  tab  I  e  sunnar 1  zes  prospects  for 
public finances  In  the medium  term. -44-
Box  5  :  Medlun-terna pro.pecta for public finance 
It  Ia  very  Important  to  dlatlngulah  for  different  definition•  of  public  budgets  :  (1)  Federal 
budget,  (2)  Public Sector  balance  (Federal,  Lander  and  local  budgeta,  includi"g  special  fYnds), 
(J)  General  Government  (all  public  budget•  Including  aoclal  aecurity,  oxcluding  public 
enterprlaea),  (4)  extended public sector,  I.e.  General  Government  plua public enterprises  •  e.g. 
federot  roil  and  poet,  Eaat Gennan  privatization body,  local  houalng companies.  Different  figures 
on  the  financial  deficit  can  In  general  be  explained~ the application of  different defintiona. 
Example  :  In  1991  the deficit of  (1)  hal  reached about  DM  52 bn,  the defJclt of  (2)  was  about  OM 
120  bn.  the  deficit  of  (3)  hal  reached  about  DM  100  bn  (Welt  Gernaan  social  eecurlty  In  aurplus) 
while  th~ deficit of  (4) may  hove  reached  DM  200  bn. 
Baaed  on  official  eatimationa and  projection• following medlum-tenn prospect• for  the development 
of  public debt  of  the different  levels of  government  are  in  the offing  : 
(1}  Federal  Government 
West  Gennan  Lander 
West  Genman  local  authorities 
East Gennan  Lander 
tast Gennan  local  authorities 
Special  funds 
o.w.  ERP 
o.w.  Fund  "German  Unt ty" 
o.w.  Loon  Management  Fund 
(2)  Public sector debt 
in  X of  GOP 
{3)  General  government  debt  (b) 
Public debt  In  bn  OM 
- un if  I ed  Ge rnaany  -












East Gennan  privatization body  25 
Old  debt  of  privatization body  70 
Old  debt  of  East Gennan  housing  sector  43 
Compensation  fund  for  expropriated 
East  Gennona  (c) 
r~deral  Rail  and  Post  140 
(4)  Extended  public sector 
in  X of  GOP 
458 
52,5X 
(a)  Aasunption  :Nominal  increase of  unified Gennon  GOP  by  81 p.a. 

















2  275 
65%  (a) 
(b)  Potential  deficits  of  social  security  will  not  affect  public  gross  debt  as  this  body  has 
large assets,  where  it will  fall  back  In  case of  deficits. 
(c)  This  fund  has still  to be  founded. 
SourJt~: See  Schmidt  (1992),  Nelllna  (1992). 
Further  risks  for  public  finance  exlat  as  regard•  (1)  debt  foregiveness  for  Eoslern  and  Southern 
countries  and  (2)  export  guorantiea  to Eaetern  countrlee.  As  the  debt  of  the  different  apecial 
tund'  rei a ted  to  Eoet  Gennany  (prIvatIzatIon  body.  houalng  aector  and  ccmpenaot ion  funds)  wl H 
hove  to  be  allocated  to  the  dl fferent  level a  of  goverNHnt  in  1995  they  should  be  added  to 
general  9overnment  debt.  bringing  the  debt  ratio  to above  571,  which  is quite  close  to  the ~ 
benchmark  laid  down  in  the  convergence criteria to  be  fulfilled,  if  a  country  wonts  to enter  the 
final  stog~ of  EMU. 
~-------------~ One lrr$nrte,'t
labour nat-i<ct
This will  nci-
level refat tve
effect)  -  a:;
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3,3  larboiir nar xtt : {age deternlnants
f eature of  Gelmgn un i f icat lon. w | | |  be that the @rman
d:; a whole has to be ccrnsiderd as belng fu|f y |ntegrated.
on I y  I ead to a rap lct ad JusUrent of the East @rman wage
to the West German. level ( Interreglonal  wags-dsrEnstrat  lon
has lreen argued In Setion 1.3.3.  but it  will  also
I nf luerce t hi; belrav iour of @rrnan trade un lons .
i'l're speeri o:' rnte5lration will  be very rapld because of cttlturat,  regional
and ilngutstic  sirni lartties  and one mlght even suppose that  in a  fe,t,
years East--t\est i ntegrat ton  w | | |  be rnre  Intense than hbrth-SotJth
I ntegrat  r on . i:ur the t irre be Ing, labour<mrket i ntegrat lon ls bei ng he ld
track by shcrt--terrn pherrcrnena strch as i nadeguate transport inf rastructure,
lrrrl f lexibiiit.,  crf t,he East Germn labour force and tnappropriate si<ills.
t'{o,vever. th-.?s€ Crawbacks wlll  qg short-llved and, 9V early  1992, tlrere
are a ! reaoi,' &r-'curid 5OO tr)O corrnrters (npre than 8tr of  a | |  East @rrnan
srptoyees), i.e.  individualg llvlng  [n East Germany but ruorklng ln West
Gerrnany.3ll
it  is pern&ps not surprislng that rGOl lrageg in East Gennany have rlsen
since rrpnetarv i,!nton, Thl$ was rwsary  ln order to reduee the soclal
cost of  iatrrulrr lgrdt ion:, Wh lch weq lcf have been lrportant not on ly  i.n
West Gerrnany .  Fa ln ly  I n response to the preva | | | ng shortages In the
houslng srctor, bur atso In East Gemtny, nulnly bcause of the mlgratlon
of the rncst ef i , c lent mffiers of tfie labour fore.  l{oilgv€t' ,  adjustment
took place at an 4stqnlshlngly fast rate, sotethlng Which ls dlff icult to
reconcile witn the rapid clegtlne fn productlve Jdg, tlr€ ounterparts of
wfrlch ar.e rr:ccr'$€d Fnd hldclgn ungrplg!'rent.  ,Glvan the further and
pr,obabty lli:rvciclable acljustment of  labour and. JoO losses, the cruclal
r$lestlon i$ ,'r(J{ rnedlum-term  wage dcnrelofrrentg In tlrest @rmany wlll  be
af f€cted,.  -,.f or the t lrre be i,ng, rea I ruages , 1,4 tlbst GEfmny are cont I nu I ng
tg',F tse at the s:rrx: fate as prevlously, | .e. regErdless of  labour market
?  ^^L  t.-,-^-ai, ,del/siefrrents  t n East (ierrnany.
,,  t.'  l,''  , 




--.---d,L-'  -:.  - -;. -- .' 33 Se* e. g . i_'j-U r 31 1992 )-46-
First,  rnarked  wage  discrepancies  will  affect  migration  and  hence  the 
relative  puwer  of  the  unions  In  reaching  any  settlement.  Second.  rapid 
wage  adJustment  would  reduce  the  po~~er  of  trade  unions  since  it would 
I ead  to  h I gher·  unanp I o~nt I n  East  Germany.  As  h 1  gh  un611) 1  o}'ment  wou 1  d 
also  aff~t  migration,  trade  unions  will  have  to  strlk·e  an  optun.rn 
balanc~  between  the  level  of  wage  discrepancy  and  the  level  of 
unemplo~nt.  The  crucial  detenninants are  the elasticities of migration 
with  regard  to  the  wage  differential  and  the elasticity of migration of 
the  unar1p! oyed,  whIch  w i I I  probab I y  rise  over  time.  1  n  the  case  of 
per feet  I aoour  mob i I I ty,  no  wage  d i f ferent i a 1  between  East  and  West 
Ger :T1any  wou I d  anerge and  the rea I  fa  I 1-back wages  for West  German  worker~s 
would  aepend  on  the  elasticity of  real  wages  with  respect  to  (overall) 
unanployment.  In  the  rrore  unlikely  case  of  labour  inmobllity,  markets 
could  be more effectively segmented. 
M:>de  ~  -uas~d  evidence  suggests  that  the  e I ast I cIty  of  rea I  wages  wIth 
regard  to  the  unemplo~nt rate  is  around  1,5 after  three  years.  In  the 
c3se of  perfectly  integrated  labour markets,  this means  that an  Increase 
in overal I  unemplo~nt rate by  4  percentage points wl I I  bring  down  real 
34  wages  by  6%  in  the  longer  term. 
It  is  also  In  this context  that  subsidizing  East  German  enterprises via 
the  Tt~euhandanstalt wi II  jeopardize  the  wage  moderation  that  Is  needed. 
Despite  rapid  wage  equal lzation,  unemplo~nt  would  be  lower  than 
otherwise  and  the  trade  unions  would  be  able  to protect  the West  German 
wage  level.  Therefore,  the  loose budget constraint which  Is,  for  the time 
be I ng,  one  character I st  i c  of  the·  trans  format I on  of  the  East  German 
econany  could  have  detrimental  mecHun-term  effects  on  the  micro 
performance of  the overall  German  econcmy  In that the requisite real-wage 
adjustment wl 11  take place with a  time  lag. 
Nevertheless,  It can  generally be concluded  that West  German  real  wages 
wil I  be  below  the  level  at  which  they  would  have  been  without 
unification,  Irrespective of the redistribution  Issue.  The extent of this 
ad tustment  depends  on  the degree of  I abour-market  IntegratIon,  whIch w I I I 
probably be extensive. 
34  The-- lMF  estimates  that  an  1  ncrease 
percentage  point  reduces  rea I  wages 
~L~~~  jdQ~~- <  1  990  > . 
In  the  unemplo~nt  rate  of 
by  2%  In  the  long  run.  See 
! 
~  I 
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I  '  ., ....... 
X 
m  =  f(u~w) 
d  m  >  0 
d  u 
d  u  < 0 
d  w 
unemployment (u) 
d  m  >  0 
d  w 
At  point.  x,  the wage differential is small. but  migration is large 
bccau~e ;J h1gh wage induced unemployment. At  pointy. East  Gerrnan 
wages and thus une1nployment is small,but migration grows  because 
of a  lart_~e  ""Vn~e differential. Thus the optimal situation  lies 
between the extremes and depends upon the parameters of the 
interrelation~: between wages, unemployment and migration. 
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3.4.  Structural  policy 
Despite  recamendatlons  fran  different  QUarters,35  discussion  of  the 
Interrelationship between German  unification and  the review of structural 
poI I c I es  has  so  far  been  conf I ned  to  the  Issue  of  provIdIng  more 
f I nanc I a I  resources  for  the  reconstruct  I on  process.  HoNever,  there  are 
also  a  nunber  of  more  far:-reachlng  Issues.  There  Is  first  the  need  to 
revIew  reg  I ona I  poI Icy  In Germany  as  a  who I e.  The  spec  1  a I  ass  I stance  for 
the  former  border  areas of West Germany wIth East Germany  Is certa  I n I y  no 
longer  justified.  These  areas  assuned  overnight  a  central  location  not 
on I y  In  Germany  but  a I so  In  Europe  as  a  who I e.  S I nee  they  have  no 
significant  Infrastructure  weaknesses,  they  now  enjoy  comparative 
advantages  particularly  In  relation  to  the  adJacent  areas  of  East 
Germany.  Therefore,  In  order  not  to discriminate  against  the  latter  as 
product I on  locatIons,  a  rapid  revision  of  these  policies  Is  urgently 
needed.  Sane  Initial  steps  have  been  taken,  tlaNever,  partly CCJT1)ensated 
for  by  new 1  y  Introduced  subsIdy  schanes,  e.g.  for  the  new  capIta  I 
(Ber II  n). 
General  Investment  aids  granted  by  the  Lander  and  local  authorities  In 
West  Germany  w I I I  a I so  have  to  be  d I snant I eel.  Any  I ncent I ve  In  West 
Germany  acts  as  a  dIs  I ncent I ve  to  I nves'bnent  In  East  Germany.  As  I oca I 
and  regional  authorities  In  East  Germany  are  experiencing  tight 
constraints as  regards their  financial  roam  for manoeuvre,  such subsidies 
m  1  ght  jeopardIze the East German  catchIng-up scenar I o  In the meet I un term 
36 
when  I nves'bnent  subsIdIes  In East Germany  have to be  reduced. 
A  part  1  cuI ar  1  y  1111J()rtant  Issue  reI  ates  to  sector  a I  poI I c I es.  Severa  I 
sectors  in  both  West  and  East  Germany  reI  y  on  subsIdIes.  A  genera  I 
dec  1  s 1  on  w I I 1  have  to  be  taken  regardIng  those  sectors  where  the 
structural  adjustment  process  needs  to be  speeded  up  and  those where  It 
needs  to be m 1  t  1  gated  vI  a  subsIdIes.  For  Instance,  the East  German  coa I 
Industry,  although  not competitive on  the world market,  Is probably more 
product 1  ve  than  its  West  German  counterpart.  If  over  a I I  German  coa I 
35 Cf.  EC-Cannlsston  ( 1990). 
36 For  an  overv  1  eli- of  I nves'bnent  subsIdIes  In  West  Germany,  see  I FO-
Instltut  (1988)  and  the  Thirteenth  SUbsidy  Report  of  the  Federal 
Government,  Bundesreglerung  (1991).  For  an  overview  of  Investment 
subsidies  In  East  Germany  compare  Bundesmlnlsterlum  fur  Wlrtschaft 
(1991). -49-
production  Is not  to be  Increased significantly,  adjustment will  have  to 
be  speeded  up  1  n  West  Germany.  OtherwIse,  the cxmparat I ve  I y  product I ve 
East  German  coa 1  1  ndustry wou I d  be unnecessar I I y  cut  back  In sIze.  What 
Is  more  I  wIth  the  S2llle  etroUnt  of  subsIdy  I  more  East  German  Jobs  wou I d 
survive as subsidies per  employee would be  lower. 
The  same  Is  true of  agriculture.  Here  too,  the  production  structure  In 
East  Germany  cou 1  d  be made more product I ve gIven  the  I arge sIze of  new I y 
restructured  hoI dIngs.  And  so,  a I though  the  over  a I I  nl.IT1ber  of  those 
employed  will  have  to  decline  signIfIcantly  In  East  Germany,  f lnanclal 
resources  could  be  saved  by cutting  back  production  In West  Germany  and 
preserving productive structures  In East Germany. 
As  regards  labour~rket repercussions,  such  a  shift  In priorities would 
a I so  have  the  advantage  that  opt  I ona I  Jobs  are  probab  I y  more  eas I I y 
aval lable  In the areas of West  Germany  that are concerned  since they  have 
a  COTl)et It  I ve  econan  I c  structure.  In  East  Germany,  reg I ona I  mass 
unemplo~t would  be unavoidable. 
HoNever,  d I f ferent  pr I or It  I es  mIght  have  to  be  set  In  other  areas.  In 
the  steel  Industry,  for  Instance,  no  genuine  productive  base  exists  In 
East  Germany.  Steel  was  made  fran  scrap  Iron  lnl)Orted  fran  the  USSR. 
Transport  costs  are  extrenely  high  and  production  methods  are  very 
old-fashioned.  Given  that  the  steel  Industry  In  West  Germany  and  In 
Western  Europe  has  modernized  and  rationalized  Its activities over  the 
last  twenty  years  and  since overcapacltles exist on  the world market,  It 
could  be  very costly  to preserve  and  modernize  steel  production  In  East 
Germany. 
Sh ipbulldlng  might  be  1  n  a  similar  posit  I on.  HoNever,  more  pranlstng 
chat lenges  might  be  faced  since  special lzatlon  In  specific  market 
segnents  has,  for  exemp 1  e,  enab  I ed  West  German  sh I pbu I I dIng  to  canpete 
I nternat lona  I I y. 
The  efficiency of  the  West  German  economy  depends  to  a  large extent  on 
1  ts  hea 1  thy  structure of  sma I. I ,  med I un-s  I zed  and  I arge  enterprIses.  In 
order  to  establish  a  similar  structure  In  East  Germany,  local 
enterpreneur I a I  potent I a I  shou I d  be  exp  I o I ted.  OtherwIse,  the  danger 
exists that the main  economic  declslon~klng  centres wl I I  be  located  In -50-
West  Germany.  Therefore,  attention  should  be  paid  to  involving  East 
German  res  I dents  In  the  pr I vat  I zat ion  process.  In  add It  ion,  Investment 
lncent lves  should  be  In  the  form of  direct  Investment  aids  rather  than 
tax  allowances whtch  would  favour  west Genman  Investors to the detriment 
of  East German  Investors,  who  face  I I quId  I ty constraInts and  w I I I  not  be 
able to make profits  in the short tenn.  Promoting entrepreneurial  skl lis 
t n  East  Germany  wou 1  d  have  effects  on  mot 1  vat  I on  whIch  shoU 1  d  not  be 
disregarded. 
4.  The  Issue of redistribution 
c..erma.n  unification  Involved  merging  two  econanles  with  difFerent 
savIng-· investment  ba I ances.  East  Germany  was  an  econany  i n  whIch  denand 
outstr  1  pped  supp I y.  wIth  excess  dEmand  havIng  been  suppressed  by 
centrally planned  regulation and coordination.  West  Germany  Is an  econany 
In WhIch  danest I c  supp 1  y  has exceeded danest I c  danand.  wIth excess  supp  r y 
being  exported.  thereby  faci lltatlng  the  conduct  of  anti-Inflationary 
poI i c i es  abroad.  ConseQuent I y,  and  despIte the  huge  supp I y-dEmand  gap  In 
East  Germany,  the  under I y I ng  sav  I ng-1 nvestment  ba  I ance  for·  Gerrrany  as  a 
whole  has more or  less been  In eQUII lbrlum.37 
Furthermore,  the  911 I ng  In  the  a I 1-Gennan  cur  rent-account  ba 1  ance  needed 
fo  I 1  ON I ng  the  IntegratIon  of  East  Germany  was  eas I I y  achIeved  ., n  the 
1990/91  period  thanks  to  highly  Integrated  International  goods  markets 
and  soar  e  product I ve capac It  I es abroad. 
In  the  absence of  a  sign  I f I cant  supp I y-denand  gap  In  a  un i f I ed  Germany, 
and  w 1  th  the  911 I ng  In  the  current-account  ba  I ance  having  been  eas i I y 
achieved,  the recently accelerating  Inflationary pressures  In Genmany  and 
the  subseQUent  strains  regarding  the  danestlc  policy  mix  and 
International  monetary policy can  be  traced  back  to the still unresolved 
QUestion  of  redistribution  In  Genmany.  Indeed,  redistribution  tn  favour 
of East  Germany  has  not yet  been  a  major  Issue  In Genmany.  In  I lne with 
Its  ph 1  1  osophy  announced  dur  I ng  the  run-up  to  un  I f I cat  I on  and  to  the 
elections  of  1990,  viz.  that  German  unification means  ''1\bbody  wll I  be 
37  AdJusting  the  1991  current-account  deficit  of  unified  Germany  for 
cyclical  factors  (growth  In  world  trade  below  trend)  and  cne~ff 
unilateral  transfers  (Gulf  war,  Soviet  Union),  the  current  account 
returns to balance. -51-
hurt,  but  a  lot  of  people  will  feel  better  off",  the  Governnent  has 
always  denied  that  integrating  East  Germany  and  adjusting  the  levels of 
per  capIta  i ncane  In  East  and  West  Germany  reQUIre  any  attempts  at 
redistribUtion. 
HaNever,  a I I gnnent  of  tne  1  1  vI  ng  standards  of  East  German  res  I dents  on 
those  In west  Germany  Inevitably  raises  the  Issue of  redistribution.  As 
both  East  German  product I vI ty  I eve Is  and  productIve  capac It  I es  w I I I  be 
lower  than  In West  Germany,  real  resources  have  to be provided  to bring 
about  the  adjustment  In  living  standards.  Moreover,  the  rebuilding  of 
the  East  German  econcmy  reQUIres  add It  I  ana I  resources  to  push  up  the 
Investment ratio  In Genmany. 
The  Issue  of  redistribution  has  to  be  assessed  from  different 
perspectives.  First of  alI,  a  larger  share of  publ lc expenditure  In GOP 
wou I d  reQU Ire  a  reduct I  on  In  pr  I vate-sector  expendIture  or  a  reduct  I on 
(Increase)  In  the  current-account  surplus  (def lclt).  Within  the  public 
sector,  the  d I str  I but  I on  Issue  a I so  concerns  the  d I f ferent  I eve Is  of 
goverrment  and  the  shifting  of  expenditure  to  East  Germany,  to  the 
detriment of West  Genmany.  Within the private sector,  the  Issue of who  Is 
to  shou I der  the  burden  Is  cruc  1  a 1  too.  HIgher  I nd 1  rect  taxes  wou I d 
pr I  mar I I y  reduce  rea I  d I sposab I e  I ncane  of  prIvate  househo  Ids.  Wh I I e 
hIgher  dIrect  taxes  wou I d  have  s lm I I ar  effects  on  d I sposab I e  I ncane,  a 
reduct I on  In  subsIdIes  wou I d,  as  a  f I rst-round  ef  feet,  I nf  I uence  the 
profit  situation  of  enterprises.  As  Income  tax  in  East  Germany  will  be 
low  during  the  transitional  period,  raising  direct  taxes  would  place  a 
disproportionately  large burden on West  German  residents whl le the burden 
Imposed  by  lndl.rect  taxes  would  more  eQually  - but  not  necessarily more 
fairly- shared  between East  and West  German  residents. 
For  the  time  being,  the  discussion  of  redistribution  places  special 
· responslbl I lty on  the  labour market.  Wage  moderation  Is considered  to be 
necessary  In  order  to  preserve  a  hea I thy  prof It  s I tuat I  on  for 
enterpr I ses.  Therefore,  tax-Induced  pr Ice  1  ncr  eases  shou I d  not  I ead  to 
hIgher  wages.  As  a  conseQUence,  West  German  wage-earners wou I d  bear  most 
of  the burden. 
As  regards  the  pub I lc  sector,  the  transfers  necessary  to  support  East 
Germany  have  Indeed  been  f I nanced  by  hIgher  taxes  and  a  rruch  I arger -52-
def I cIt  .  On I y  mInor att81l)ts have been made  to cut back expenditure or  t 
"'  ta  I lor  pr lor It  I es  on  the  expendIture  sIde  to  support 1  ng  EaSt-- Ge 
Furthermore,  East-West  distribution  Is  severely  lf11)eded  by  the 
non-Inclusion of  the  East  German  Linder  In  the  very  generous  financial 
eQualization  mechanism  ("Finanzausglelch
11
).  The  West  German  Lander  are 
not  therefore  cuttIng  back  expendIture  1  n  order  to  free  rea  1  and 
financial  resources  for  East  Genmany.  In  actual  fact,  the opposite can 
be  observed.  The  favourable  econanlc  situation  in  the  West  German 
Linder,  together  with  the  tax  Increases,  has  considerably  boosted  tax 
revenue,  and  thIs  has  even  I ed  to  an  expansIon  In  pub I I c  expendIture. 
Indeed,  expenditure by the West  German  Linder  Increased by  7%  In  1991. 
Wage  developnents  wi II  also  affect  the  relative  financial  situation  at 
the different  tiers of  government.  While  the central  government  is  less 
affected by wage  1  ncr  eases  In the pub  1  I  c  sector,  the Lander  and  the  1  oca I 
authorities  will  be  affected  disproportionately  by  such  Increases.  As 
regards  the Lander  and  the  local  authorities  In East  Genmany,  the  likely 
wage  adJustment  will  considerably  widen  the  gap  between  revenue  and 
expendIture,  fur  the,- sQueezIng  the roan for manoeuvre  in the East. 
To  sun  up,  a  great  dea I  has  to  be  done  to  gIve  pr  I or  I ty  to  boost I ng 
expenditure aimed  to  Improving economic  fundamentals  In East Genmany.  The 
East  German  Linder  have  to  be  Included  In  the  financial  eQUal izatlon 
mechanism,  and  expenditures  In  the West  German  Linder  have  to  take  Into 
account  the  substantIa  I  needs  In  East  Germany.  CUtt I ng  expendIture  Is 
necessary  In  order  to provIde  f I nanc I a I  and  rea  I  resources,  e.g.  In  the 
area of  1  nfrastructure  Investment.  t«>t  reducIng both  Investment  subsIdIes 
and  subs  1  dIes  for  preservIng  unproductIve  act  I vItI  es  In  West  Germany 
postpones  and  lnl)edes  the  energence of  a  favourable climate  for  pr lvate 
Investment  In East Germany. 
Within  the private sector,  considerable  Investment  has  to  be  undertaken 
1  n  East  Germany  and  ma I nta  1  ned  In  West  Germany  In  order  to create  the 
number  of  new  jobs  necessary  to absorb  the oversupply of  labour  In  East 
Germany.  ThIs  reQU 1  res  favourab  I e  prof It  expectat Ions  over  the  med I un 
term.  Wage  moderat I  on  wou I d  be  one  ln1)0rtant  e I anent.  As  the  German 
labour  market will  probably  Integrate at a  rapid  rate,  downward  pressure 
on  wages  w  1  1  1  1  ncr  ease  as  the  add It  I ona I  1  nf  I  ON  of  East  German  I abour 
w 1  1  1  darf1)en  wage  1  ncreases.  For  thIs  mechan I sn  to  work  ef  feet I ve  I y. 
hoNever ,  the  pub 1  1  c  sector  rrust  not  1111)0se  a  grON I ng  sQUeeze  .on  rea  I -53-
disposable  lncane.  Such  unprepared  tax  Increases  have  been  mainly 
respons t b I e  for  the emergence of the present d I str  I but  I on strugg  I e  wIthIn 
the  pr lvate sector.  Therefore,  even  If cuts  In  subsidies were  to  reduce 
corporate prof Its In the short term,  medlun-term wage developnents should 
favour  a  redistribution of  Income  towards profits,  thereby  Improving  the 
prospects  for  Investment. 
HavIng  saId  th  1  s,  one  can  l'lON  C011)8re  the  normatIve  scenarIo  to  the 
red  I str  I but  I ona I  measures  actua  I I y  chosen.  Indeed,  huge  M'Ollnts  of 
fiscal  resources  have  been  channelled  to East  Germany.  By  merging major 
e I enents  of  the  West  and  East  German  soc  I a I  secur I ty  systens,  I . e. 
pens I on  funds  and  unenp I o~t  schanes,  many , b I I I Ions  of  0-Marks  have 
been  and w I I I  be  InJected  Into the East German  schEmes,  whIch are runnIng 
enomn.~s def I c Its. 
1  n  add I t 1  on,  the  very  generous  exchange  rate  for  the  Ostmark  has 
I ncr  eased  the  net  wea I th  of  East  German  asset-hoI  ders,  I . e.  pr I vate 
hoUseho Ids.  It has,  hoNever,  I ed  to  a  sIgn  I f I cant  deter I or  at  I on  In  the 
financial  position of East  German  borrowers,  I.e.  the corporate sector. 
And  so,  the  ach  I evsnent  of  monetary  unIon  In  Ju I y  1990  was  a I ready 
accar()8n I ed by a  massIve red I str  I but  I on  In favour of East German  pr Iva  te 
hoUseho Ids,  a I though  thIs was  at the expense of  the corporate  sector  In 
East  Germany,  Inc  1  ud I ng  the  pub  I I  c I y  owned  housIng  sector  .  SUCh  a 
redistribution runs counter  to the normative rationale of redistribution, 
according to which  real  rates of return on East Genman  Investment capital 
shou I d  be supported. 
Furthenmore,  sound  financing of these  transfers has  been  lacking  so  far. 
In the run-up to unification and to the elections of  1990,  the Government 
neg 1  ected  the  need  for  red I str  I but I on.  But  a I so after  the  e I ect  Ions,  It 
did not  Initiate a  constructive redistribUtion debate.  Furthenmore,  these 
transfers  were  not  f lnanced  via  expenditure cuts,  nsnely  In  subsidies. 
S I nee  no  consensus  ex I sts  In  Germany  on  the  proper  f I nanc  I ng  of  the 
transfer of  resources,  actual  redlstrlbutlonal  policy  Is mainly  placing 
the burden on  those groups receiving  labour  Income or transfer  Income.  As 
a  matter of  fact,  the unresolved  QUestion of redistribution has  led to a 
problematic  pol Icy  mix,  I.e.  expansionist  fiscal  policy  and  tight 
IR)netary  poI Icy,  wh I I e  oonsuners,  wage-earners  and  transfer-rec  I p 1  ents -54-
(In West  Germany)  will  have  to pay  for  the  Hfree  lunch  ..  offered to East 
Germany.  HoNever,  as  the  trade  unIons  seem  UI'WII I I I ng  to  pay  the  b I I I 
whIch  the  a:>verrment  has  pI  aced  before  them  wIthout  any  oonsu I tat  Ions 
taking  place,  a  maJor  redlstrlbutlonal  conflict  lies  ahead  In  (West) 
Germany  whIch  may  undermIne  the  soc  I a I  consensus,  the  bus  I ness  and 
consuner  c I I  mate  and  the  posItIve  Investment  oond It  Ions  necessary  for 
dynsn  I  c  Investment and grONth. -55-
Ill.  THE  UNITED  GERMANY  IN  EUROPE  :  E~IC  ASPECTS 
1.  Introduction 
The  changes  which  have  taken  pI  ace  In  Europe  In  recent  years  w I I I  have 
far-reaching  Implications  for  the  European  Ccmrunlty  (EC).  They  Include 
t·he  econaralc  effects of  German  unIfIcation.  All  EC  countr les  have  been 
affected  significantly.  First,  German  unification  triggered  demand 
effects  which  stirrulated  eoonanlc  activity  In  the  other  EC  countries. 
These  expansionary  effects  have  been  partly offset  by  tighter  monetary 
conditions  In Germany.  Although,  In the short  tenn,  this state of affairs 
was  beneficial  to the other  EC  countries,  the question as  to whether  the 
changed  policy  mix  In  Germany  might  affect  them  adversely  In  future  Is 
important.  The  medlun-term  econanlc  lltl)llcatlons  stan  fran  the 
catchIng-up  process  and  the  IntegratIon  of  East  Germany  1  nto  the  EC 
eoonamy  but also from  the growing amount of trade with Eastern Europe. 
Wh I I e  sect  I on  2  be  I ow  concentrates  on  these  econan  I c  Imp 1  I cat  1  ons, 
Section  3  Is concerned with pol It  leal ly significant Questions of European 
economic  integration.  Section  3.1  attempts  to evaluate  the  consequences 
of econanic  imtJalances  In Germany  for  the process of econanic  lntegrat ion 
in  the  context  of  econanlc  and  monetary  union  (EM.J).  Internal  market 
quest ions  ar·e  Important  too,  since  the  econanlc  weight  of  Germany  and 
German  enterprises  In  the  Internal  market will  probably  increase  (Section 
3. 2) .  l"bt  nn 1  y  the  openIng  of  the  I nterna  I  German  border  but  a I so  the 
restructur i ng  (Jf  Eastern  Europe  reQuIre  I arge  M'lOUnts  of  capIta  I .  The 
question  as  to whether  those countries  Involved  In  a  catching-up  process 
within  Western  Europe  will  be  faced  with  a  setback  are  Important  too 
(Section 3.3).  Finally,  Section 3.4 deals with the EC's options vis-a-vis 
Eastern  Europe.  It will  be  argued  that,  In  order  to  ltr()rove  econanlc 
prospects  i 11  Eastern  Europe,  a  poI Icy  of  openIng  up  markets  Is  more 
efft~tive white.  In the case of barriers to market entry,  those countries 
w  i l I  have  t.o  be  supported  by  transfer  pa~nts  In  order  to  avert 
I ar  ge--sca I e  rrovenents  of  I abour .  I n  cone I us  I on,  I t  w I I I  be  exam I ned 
whether  Ger~in unification can  serve as a  model  for  the transfonmatlon of 
Eastern  Eun  .. )pe  or  whether  the  sane  effects can  be  expected wIth  the  ErvU 
process.  !  ".:  w 1 I I  be  found  that  German  unIfIcation  does  not  provIde  a 
blueprint  in either case but that  It can provide  Important  lessons. -56-
2.  Short-ter•  and .adiClll-ter• effects on  the EC  8COI10'IY 
2.1  Demand  effects 
A I I  the other  EC  countrIes,  together wIth  the EFTA  countrIes,  the ltll  ted 
States  and  Japan,  have  Increased their exports to Gennany  significantly. 
In  the  f I rst  pI  ace,  the  maJor  shIft  In  the  preferences  of  East  German 
consuners  In  favour  of Western  prOducts,  coup I eel  wIth  supp  I y  shortages, 
have  st  lrrulated  Imports  fran  the  other  EC  countr les.  While  sane 
countr I es,  notab  I y  Oermark,  the  Bene 1  ux  countr 1  es  and  Spa 1  n,  Increased 
the  I r  share  of  the  en I arged  German  market  lnmed I ate  1  y,  other  oountr 1  es 
took  longer.  France,  Italy  and  the  United  Kingdon  In  particular,  but 
also  the United  States  and  Japan,  have  recorded  the  highest  growth  rate 
of exports only after one year of German  unl f lcatlon.  Table  4  shaNs  the 
percentage  Increases  In  exports  to  Germany  after  unIfIcatIon.  It 
suggests that,  In those countries which  have  Increased their exports only 
with a  time  lag,  the positive demand  effect  Is  longer-lasting. 
TABLE  4  :  GERMAN  IMPORT  PERFORUANCES  AFTER  UNIFICATION 
- X change  on  the same  period a  year earlier-
3nd  4rd  1st  2nd  3rd  4th 
Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  Quarter  quarter 
1990  1990  1991  1991  1991  1991 
Belgium  +  Lux.  12' 1  31,9  29,0  27,0  13,6  -5,1 
Denmark  22,5  31 ,3  33,9  29,2  16,0  4,8 
Spain  30,3  38,0  46,7  41,2  25,2  11,4 
France  15,0  10,6  20,9  38,5  19,4  6,9 
Greece  3,5  8,4  8'  1  4,9  19,4  2,8 
Ire land  11 '7  6,9  13,6  13,3  17,0  11,3 
Italy  17,4  20,1  22,0  19'  1  18,0  2,8 
Netherlands  8,7  17,1  20,8  18,4  5,6  1 ,0 
Portugal  17,5  20,1  22,5  21,5  18,5  11,7 
United  Kingdom  7,1  13,4  17,5  21,6  16,5  4,4 
EEC  13,3  18,6  23,1  25,8  15,3  3,2 
Other  countries 
United States  -0,9  -9,6  2,3  20,7  30,8  11 ,2 
Japan  7,2  2,7  14,8  32,2  26,2  9,1 
TOTAL  10,5  14,5  18,0  23,3  17,4  4,0 
Sgyr~~  Bundesbank,  Monthly  Report,  Supplement  3 • 
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There  Is  no  doubt  that  these  demand  effects  have  stlrrulated  econanlc 
grc:wth  In  the other  EC  countr I es at a  t I  me  when  grONth was  s I  ON I ng  dONn. 
The  actua  I  st  lrn.J 1  us to grc:wth  depends  on  severa  1  factors.  The  1  arger  the 
share  of  exports  to  Germany  In  GJP,  the  greater  the  effect  on  grONth  . 
Tab I e  5  suggests  that  the  short-term  st  lrn.J I us  to  grONth  due  to  hIgher 
exports  was  significant  In  all  EC  countries,  ranging  fran  0,6%  (both 
years)  In  Spain  to  1,6%  In  Benelux.  German  unification  has,  therefore, 
actually had a  locomotive effect. 
HoNever ,  substant I a I  I eakages  through  add It  I ona  I  lr11X)rts  In  sna 1  1  open 
econan  I es  wou I d  reduce  the  dIrect  llll)act  on  GJP  bUt  wou I d  have 
stimulating effects  In other  countries.  In order  to answer  the  question 
of  haN  GlP  grc:wth  has  been  stlrn.Jiated  In  partner  countries  as  a 
consequence  of  these  fIrst-round  and  second-round  effects,  the  DIW  has 
carr I ed  out  a  mode I  s lrn.J I at  I on  wIth  the  EC-Quest  mode  I ,  takIng  Into 
account  the  lrrcx>rtance of  the German  market  for  the  respect I ve countr I es 
and  the reduct I on ef  feet due to  lf11)0rt  I eakages.  As  Quest was  used  1  n  I ts 
linked no:te,  the  secondary  spill-over  effects vls-8-vls  third countries 
were  taken  Into aooount.38 
Also  according  to  this  slrulatlon,  grONth  effects  on  partner  countries 
have  been  significant,  despite  the  parallel  tightening  of  monetary 
cond I t Ions.  The  resu Its,  haNever,  have  to be  QUa 1  I f I ed  In at  I east  two 
respects.  First,  the  short-term  effect  on  partner  countr les might  have 
been  even  I arger  s I nee  supp I y  constraInts  I ed  to  a  I ess  aggressIve 
attItude on  the part of German  exporters.  The weak  export performance was 
due  not  to  weaker  pr Ice  CX'J1l)et It  I veness  bUt  maIn  I y  to  s I  ONer  grONth 
abroad and tight supply conditions  In Germany  foiiONing unification.  As  a 
result,  partner countries were able to gain market  shares  fran Germany  on 
theIr  heme  markets  and  In  those  countrIes  In  whIch  they  CX'J1l)ete  wIth 
Germany. 
Second,  tighter monetary conditions  In Germany might  have had restrictive 
effects  In  partner  countries.  This  transnlsslon  mechanlsn  has  been 
underscored _Inter  a I I a  In studIes by the OECD  and  the  ltE.  39 
38  See OIW  (32/1991)  and also Horn/Scherc:met/ZWiener  ( 1991). 
39  See OECD  ( 1991)  and Masson/Mered I th  ( 1990). -58-
Tab I e  5  SH:lRT-TEFN  GfOIITH  EFFECTS  OF  GEFNAN  l..f\J I F I CAT I ON 
FOR  PARTJER  CCl.NTR I  ES 
- I ncr  ease  In GJP  grONth  In percentage poInts  -
July. 1990-June  1991  July  1991.-June  1992 
Belgtun/Luxemb.  0,6  , ,0 
Dennark  0,4  0,7 
Spain  0,2  0,4 
France  0,3  0.5 
Greece  0,4  0,7 
Ireland  0,3  0,8 
Italy  0,3  0.6 
Netherlands  0,7  0,9 
Portugal  0,3  0~4 
Un I ted K I ngdan  0,2  0,5 
Source:  COmmission  services. 
2.2  Monetary  effects 
The  monetary  effects  of  German  unification  on  partner  couiitr-ies  are 
difficult  to  evaluate  empirically.  The  Increase  In  Interest  rates 
occur  red pr I  mar I I y  In Germany.  F I nanc  I a I  markets reacted very scept I ca  I I y 
to  the  announcenent  of  monetary  unIon  and  I ong-term  Interest  ~a  tes  l n 
Germany  Junped  by  a I  most  200 bas Is poInts.  Short-term  Interest rates were 
not  I ncr  eased  unt  I I  monetary  unIon  becsne  ef  feet I ve  In  Ju I y  1990.  S I nee 
then,  short-term  Interest  rates  have  been  Increased  on· several  occasions 
by  the  Bundesbank,  bUt  I ong-term  Interest  rates  experIenced  a  d<.::IWnward 
trend.  Graph  6  depIcts  these movements  In  Interest rates  In Germany. 
Interest  rates  rose  to  a  much  lesser  extent  In  the other  OAS  countries 
and  the  Interest-rate  differential  narrONed  significantly  in  February 
1990.  when  monetary  un 1  on  was  announced..  Thus,  German  f  I nanc i a I  markets 
attracted  a  larger  risk  prantun.  M:>reover,  the  Increases  In  shOrt-term 
1  nterest  rates  have  not  been  reproduced  In  fu  I I  In  the  other  EMS 
countries and  the  Interest-rate differential  almost disappeared vis-a-v1s 
sane  countr les.  In  France,  the  author It  les  were  even  able  to  reduce 
short-term  Interest rates when  German  rates were on  an  upward  trend,  and 
the  differential  with  the  0-Mark  at  times  actually  became  negative. 
Graph  7  shoWs  Interest-rate movements within the SMS. in% 
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Graph 6 
Short and long-term interest rates 
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HaNever,  In  order  to  evaluate  the  rronetary  1111)8Ct,  which,  Juctgl_ng  by 
Interest-rate movements,  does  not  appear  to be  very  significant,  actual 
Interest-rate movements  have  to  be  exsn  I ned  In  the  I 1  ght  of  the  I eve  I 
which  would  have  prevailed  without  German  unification.  In  such  a 
scenario,  economic activity would  probably  have  slewed  down  considerably 
and  Europe  wou I d  have  conducted  a  more  expansIonary  monetary  poI Icy. 
Therefore,  short-term  Interest  rates  In particular would  have  been  much 
lONer,  although  the  effect  on  long-term  Interest  rates  would  have  been 
less pronounced.  Indeed,  while monetary relaxation  In the lillted States, 
where short-term  Interest rates declined by 250 basis points during  1991, 
I ect  to  a  dec  I I ne  In  I ong-term  Interest  rates  of  on  I y  70  bas Is  poInts, 
French  I  ong-tenm  Interest  rates  fe  I I  by  110  bas Is  poInts  over  the 
saneper I od,  wIth  short-term  Interest  rates  dec  I In  I ng  by  on I y  30  bas Is 
points. -60-
Graph 7 
Developments of German and French interest rates -a comparison 
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~tary tightness does  not  depend  solely on  Interest  rates but  also on 
the  level  of the exchange rate.  The  QUeStion as to what  the exchange rate 
wou 1  d  have been wIthout  un  I f I cat  I on  1  s,  of course,  very hypothet  I ca  I •  On 
the  one  hand,  the  I arger  r I sk  pran  I Lm  attached  to  the  0-Mark  - a 
ref  1  ect  I on  not  on 1  y  of German  un  I f 1  cat  I on  but  a I ao of  econan lc prob  I ems 
In  the countries of  Eastern  Europe  - has certainly weakened  the ~rk. 
Therefore,  1  n  the absence of  un  I f I cat  I on  and  wIth wronetary  I oosen I ng  In 
the ltll  ted States.  the do  1  I ar wou I d  have  been nu::h weaker.  On  the other 
hand,  a  more  expansionary  stance of  European monetary  pol Jcy  would  have 
supported  the do  I I ar.  Therefore,  the  I eve  I  of  the do  I I ar mIght  not  have 
been  undu  1  y  affected by the c::am I ned  IJI1)aet of German  un If  teat  I on and  the 
correspondIng econan  I c  poI Icy response. 
2.3  Medium-term  effects 
German  un  1  f I cat  1  on  w 1  1  1  have  I  ong-1 ast  I ng  econan  I c  effects  on  both  the 
German  and  the  European  econany.  As  regards  trade,  a  certaIn 
normalization will  take place as the short-term dEmand  effects fade.  This 
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will  affect first the canposltlon of products  In denand  In  East Germany. 
In  the  short  term,  consuner  durables  have  been  IITl>Orted  while,  in  the 
medlun term,  Investment  goods are needed to boost  the catchlng-·UP process 
in  East  Germany.  Nevertheless,  all  countr les  will  probably  have  the 
opportunity  to run  a  substantial  trade surplus with East  Genmany.  First, 
trade  I Inks s lm i 1  ar  to those wIth other  IndustrIa  I I zed countrIes  w  I I I  be 
estab  I i shed.  Second,  the export capacIty of East Germany w I I I  rena In very 
ION  until  a  rrodern  capital  stock  has  been  created.  Third,  tt1e  lf1l)Ort 
propensIty  of  East  Germany  w I I I  be  hIgh  because  denand  w i 1 I  exceed 
productive  capacity  for  a  long  time  to  care.  This  gap  wi II  be 
particularly wide  If expectations  In East Genmany  are positive. 
Th 1  s  favourab t e  situation  w  I I I ,  hoNever,  change  gradua I I y  over  time  If 
Investment  1  n  East  Germany  I ncr  eases  supp I y.  GIven  that  rrost  of  the 
revarll)ed  East  German  econany  will  be  based  on  a  ne.v  and  thus  very 
ef  f I c i ent  capita  1  stock,  the  extra  supp  I y  generated  w I I I  probab t y  be 
h 1  gh I y  carpet It'  ve.  s I nee  the  Infrastructure  w I I I  a I so  be  cons i derab  I y 
Improved,  the  nat~  East  German  econany  might  display  similar  features  to 
those of  the West  Genman  eoo~  In the  1950s and  1960s,  when  the capital 
stoc:k  anbodled  greater  technical  progress  relative  to  that  of  other 
countries. 
For  the  West  German  and  the  European  econany,  thIs  wou I d  Imp I y  keener 
canpetttlon  since  German  rTOnetary  union  would  prevent  an  adjustment  of 
the  East  German  exchange  rate  In  line  with  rising  productivity. 
Therefore,  to the extent that the catching-up process was  successful,  ttle 
East German  ecor.cmy  wou 1 d  be ab  I e  to CCJ11)ete  wIthIn the  I nterna  I  rnarket. 
The  mediLm-term  rronetary  Implications of  German  rronetary  union  ar'3  less 
certain.  Indeed,  a  dl lemma  might arise  In the 8MS  countries to the extent 
that  t I ghter  monetary  cond It  Ions  mIght  becane  necessary  In  Germany  In 
order  to  support  the  structural  adjustment  and  catching-up  process  in 
East  Germany  withoUt  engendering  Inflationary  pressures.  It  has  to  be 
recognized  that  any  per·ststent  gap  between  danand  and  supply  and/or  an 
inflationary  redistribution  struggle will  necessitate  an  adjustment  In 
the  real  exchange  rate which  can  be achieved via a  ncmlnal  exchange-rate 
adjustment  or  v:a  higher  Inflation. Clearly,  higher  Inflation  Is  not  the 
preferred option  for  the Bundesbank. -62-
I f  t I ghter  roonetary  oond I t Ions  beocme  necessary  In  Germany  In  order  to 
avoId  the  I nf  I at  I onary  oonsequences  of  the  d 1  str  1  but  I on  strugg  I e  (the 
successful  catching-up  scenario),  strains might  then  develop  In  the  8MS 
s I nee  monetary  t I ghten  I ng  mIght  be  I noons  I stent wIth  the  danest I  c  needs 
of  those  countr les.  40  The  dllenma  for  the  other  countr les  would  then 
be  aggravated  by  1111)11catlons  of  a  reallgnnent  In  terms  of  negative 
cred  I b i I I ty.  These  mIght  be  saneNhat  reduced  I f  the  D-Mark  appprec  I a ted 
against  all  other  8MS  currencies.  Financial  markets  would  then  consider 
the  reallgnnent  as  having  been  triggered  by  developments within Germany. 
Moreover,  a  ~rk  appreciation against alI other  BMS  currencies would be 
less detrimental  to the convergence process  In the BMS. 
Over  tIme,  a  rea I  deprecIatIon  of  the  0-Mark  w I I I  be  needed  If hIgher 
Investment  Is  adding  to aggregate  supply.  This  adJustment  will  probably 
be  rn.JCh  more  easily  achieved  via  lover  lnf latlon  In  Germany  than 
e I sewhere.  Therefore,  In  the  med I un  term  and  gIven  an  In It  I a I  rea  1 
apprec  1  at  I on  of  the  D-Mark,  nan  Ina  I  exchange-rate  stab  I I I ty  wou I d  be 
consistent  with  same  divergence  In  Inflation  rates  In  the  BMS,  I.e.  an 
inflation differential  In  favour of Germany. 
3.  Aspects of European  econo~~lc Integration 
3.1  Economic  Imbalances,  the convergence  process and  EMU 
The  changed  performance  of  the  German  econany  w I I I  a f feet  the  progress 
which  can  be made  on  the  road  to BMU.  Inappropriate policies  In Gennany 
but  also  In  partner  countries could  render  It more difficult to achieve 
that  goal  on  time.  For  political  reasons  Integration might  be  stepped  up 
In the world of growing uncertainties. 
As  regards  the  fundamental  Issue of  BMU,  German  unification  has  altered 
the  ro  1  e  of  the  0-Mark  as  the  anchor  wIthIn  the  BMS.  DefInIng  the 
appropr 1  ate  stance  of  monetary  poI Icy  has  becane  more  d Iff  leu It  gIven 
both  techn  I ca I  prob  I ens  and  the  I ncr  eased  uncertaIntIes  attachIng  to 
econan  1  c  prospects.  Techn 1  ca 1  prob  I ems  concern  the  t lm I ng  and  extent  of 
4C)see --e.g.  Adcms/Aiexander/Gagnon  <  1992),  who  show  that  German 
unification  will  have  a  contractlonary  effect  on  the  other  8MS 
countr les,  If  monetary  policy  In  partner  countr les  Is  geared  to 
ma 1  n ta  1  n  f i xed  nan  1  na I  par It  I es  vIs-a-vIs  the  rM  rather  than  towards 
internal  balance. -63-
tne  liKely  adjustment  of  the  f lnanclal  portfolios  of  East  German 
residents.  The  velocity  of  circulation  Is  expectedr  therefore,  to 
I ncr  ease sIgn  i f 1  cant I y.  On  the other  hand,  I arge  I ncr  eases  In East  C-:erman 
prices wl I I  increase the value of transactions and  should be reflected  In 
the  target  rate  set  by  the  Bundesbank.
41  unce,·taintles  In 
Interpreting  financial  variables  also  concern  Interest  rates.  An 
aut<~s  incr~~se In  long-tenn  Interest rates could be due either to an 
increase  in  Inflationary  expectations  and  an  expected  future  tightening 
of  rronetary  pol Icy  or  to  an  Increase  In  the  real  rate  of  return. 
Therefore,  rrovenents  In rea  I  exchange rates w 1 I 1  becxme more  llllX>rtant. 
To  the  extent  that  Intermediate monetary  Indicators  In  other  cour·:tr ies 
rerraained  relatively more  reliable,  the  anchor  role within  the  EMS  would 
be  transferred  at  least  In  part  to  those  countries.  On  account  of  Its 
4:\2 
reia.t tve  size,  this  Is  pr lmar lly  a  reference  to  France.  t-k:YNever, 
the  latitude  afforded  by  the  narrONing  Interest-rate  differential  with 
Germany  shou I d  not be used at the expense of pr Ice stab  1 I I ty  .  A  1 1  i :·1  a 1 1 , 
the  Question  of  the  optimality  of  the  asynmetry  which  has  s-:;  far 
characterized  the  working  of  the  EFM  shoUld  be  reconsidered  in  ()resent 
c i t~cuns  tances . 
lnda-:act.  other  countries  In  the  EMS  will  have  the opportunity  to  in·.prove 
the  i r  re  1  at  1  ve  cal'"()et 1  t  I veness  vIs-a-vIs  Germany  by  temporar 1 1  y 
under·  shootIng German  I nf I at  I on.  Sane countrIes,  In part  I cuI ar  those whIch 
have  energed  fran  a  long  stabilization  period  with  a  per·manent 
aopra~iatlon  in  their  real  exchange  rate,  need  a  readjustment  in  their 
rea I  exchange  rate  in  order  to boost  eJll)lo~nt or  to reduce  the  danger 
of  job  losses  in  the  more  competitive  Internal  market.  If  such 
depr·ec i at I on  in  the  rea I  exchange  rate  were  to  cx::cur  wIthout  any 
real tgnment,  positive credlbl llty effects would be substantial. 
4111~e-·-;nnua-lta;get  for  the  grONth  of  M3  Is  based  on  asslffl:)t Ions  of 
.. unavoidable  inflation••,  ngrONth  of  productive  potential", 
11Changes  In 
ve 1  oc  1 ty"  and  "monetary  cond It  Ions" .  S I nee  pr Ice  m::>venents  in  East 
Gt.:~nnany  st  111  reflect  the  adjustment  to  market  prIces,  "ur.:1votdable 
i nf  1 at  1  on..  1  n  East  Germany  mIght  be  above  1""  for  the  next  feN  years. 
Tt1ls  should be bOrne  In mind when  the target  range  Is  calcula~.ed. 
42  ConsIder! ng  the  sIze  of  Its  econany,  the  Un 1  ted  K I ngdan  cou I d,  C>f 
course.  a I so  attEf'll)t  to  pI  ay  the  anchor  ro  I e  In  ttte  EFJ\.1.  HoHever.  a 
11l.ll1ber  of  fundanenta Is  as  we I I  as  the  Governnent 's  m  i sg i vI r.gs 
regarding monetary union are major obstacles  In this respect. --64-
Never  the  I ess,  as  regards  the  functIonIng of  the  EMS,  1  t  has  a 1  ways  been 
argued that danest lc ctenand  shocks should not be remedied  by non-monetary 
rreans.  The  part I cu  1  ar  case of German  un  I f 1  cat  1  on  1  nvo  1  ves  a  s 1  gn  1  f 1  cant 
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c:tcmest I  c  shock  In  the  anchor  country.  Therefore,  as  regards  the 
funct ion  I ng  of  the  EMS,  correctIng  f I sea I  poI Icy  and  1111) 1  ernent 1  ng 
structura  I  poI I c I es  a lmed  at  openIng  up  markets  and  reducIng  subsIdIes 
wou 1  d  be the very-best opt  I on. 
At  the  micro  level,  (West)  German  Industry  In  general  should  not  be 
expected to favour  Eastern markets roore  than trad  1  t 1  ona 1 Western markets. 
On  account  of  the  I Ike. I y  underva  I uat  I on  of  the  Eastern  European 
cur  rene I es,  exports  to  these  oountr I es  w I I I  probab I y  not  consIst  of 
hIgh-techno  I ogy products  (the except I  on beIng East Germany  wh 1  ch,  because 
of  .  the  overva  I uat  I on  of  the  D-Mark  reI  at  I ve  to  product 1  v 1  ty,  w 1  1  1 
probab I y  seek  to  purchase  such  . products) .  HaNever ,  neN  product 1  on 
act I vI  t I es  In  East  Germany  may  try  to  focus  roore  on  Eastern  European 
markets  by  rebuilding  "traditional"  trade  links.  And  so,  If exports  to 
traditional  markets  were  to  cont lnue,  Germany  could  beccme  even  roore 
closely  Integrated through accelerating  Imports. 
At  the macro  level,  the counterpart- In accounting tenns- of the Genman 
current-account  surplus  has  been  the  deficit  In  certain  partner 
countr I es.  catchIng-up  mIght,  therefore,  prove  roore  d 1  f f 1  cu 1  t, 
especially as  higher  Interest  rates will  have  to replace  higher  Imports 
In  order  to  I ncr  ease  the  dIsc  I pI I nary  effects on  the  pub I I c  sector  and 
sane  Investment mIght be crQVded out.  In other words,  an overva  1  uat  I  on of 
the  currency might  beccme  less  easily sustainable  If autonanous  capital 
Inflows  dried  up.  Therefore,  countries  that  are catching  up may  have  to 
postpone  theIr  econan  I c a I I gnrent  on  the  average  EMS  I eve  I  1  f  German 
un i f I cat  I on  sIgnIfIcant  I y  Increased  capIta  I  shortages  on  the  wor 1  d 
financial  market. 
All  In all,  It should  be  clear  that,  as  long  as  the main  principles of 
macroeconan  I  c  and  m  I croeconan  I  c  behavIour  are  I arge  I y  consIstent,  for 
example,  with  the  level  of  savings,  profits  and  wages  and  with 
stab  I II  ty-or  lented  policies,  neither  German  unl f I cat  I on  nor  develor:ments 
43  1  n  terms  of  econan  I c  theory,  we  wItness  a  "permanent  taste-change 
shock",  I .e.  East  German  dEmand  has  shl fted  away  fran  East  German 
supp I y,  render I ng East German  productIve capac It  I es obso  I ete. • 
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In  Eastern  Europe  shoU I d  a Iter  the  1  ong-run  prospects  of  achIevIng 
stronger roonetary  IntegratIon  In Europe. 
3.2  United Germany  and  the  Internal  market 
German  unification  took  place  at  a  time  when  European  Integration  was 
proceeding  fast.  In particular,  the transfonmatlon of the  Internal market 
concept  Into actua  I  econan  1  c  measures was  speedIng  up.  I ntegrat  I ng  East 
Germany  Into  thIs  process  of  European  IntegratIon  thus  resenb I es  a 
greyhound  (East  Germany)  attEf'll)tlng  to catch  up  with  a  racehorse  (EC). 
The  out  I ook  for  East  Germany  depends  on  Whether  It  cteve I ops  Into  an 
attractive  location within the European  Internal market. 
HaNever,  as  the  challenge  of  Integration  proved  too  rruch  In  the  short 
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term,  many  derogations  fran  EC  legislation  were  adopted  with  a  vtew 
to  spreading  out  the  necessary  adjustments  over  time.  These  derogations 
concerned  In  part lcular  envl ronnental  aspects,  transport  rules  but  also 
subsidies.  Particularly  lf1l)Ortant  were  those  derogations  which  aiiONed 
the West  German  authorities to take measures  fostering private  Investment 
(see  the  description  of  these  measures  In  Part  1).  Generous  derogation 
clauses were politically feasible only on condition that  they applied to 
a I I  European CCJll)an I es wIshIng to do bUs I ness  In East Genmany. 
A I though  thIs  cr  I ter  I on  has  genera I I y  been  met,  I ops  I decl  effects 
benef 1  t I ng  West  German  enterpr I ses  cannot  be  exc  I uded.  For  ex2111')1 e,  I f 
Investment  subsIdIes are granted  In  the shape of deprec  I at  I on  a I I  ONances 
they  w  1  I 1  favour  West  German  enterpr  I ses.  S lm I I ar  effects  mIght  be 
expected  If privatization proved  successful  only  through  the granting of 
special  tax  aiiONances  to CCJll)anles.  As  a  result,  It might  be easter  for 
West  German  enterpr lses  to expand  In  the mec::tlun  term.  Since  EC  analyses 
have  shONn  that  the  atta  1  rment  of  opt  I  nun  sIze  and  the  presence  of 
econan  I es  of  sea  1  e  w  I I I  be  the  maIn  transn  Iss  I on  channe Is  for  hIgher 
growth  In the  Internal  market,  the position of Genman  enterprises  In  the 
Internal  market might be stronger  than would otherwise be the case. 
Moreover,  In view of  Its central  position  In the new  Europe,  Germany wl I I 
a f feet  the  forces of  grav  I ty.  Wh I I e  the West  Genman  econany  occupIed  In 
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the  past  a  peripheral  lcx:atlon  In  the CcnmJnlty,  It can  nc:.~  act  as  the 
br !dge between  the EC  countr les and  the oountr les of Eastern Europe.  Th 1  s 
makes  Germany  more attract  lve as  an  Investment  l<:x::at I on.  h1  part leu iar, 
those  i ndustr les  wh lch  need  skI lied  latxxJr  and  for  which  there  1  s  a 
danand  In  f.:.astf::r·n  Europe mIght  fInd  1  t  attract  1  ve to bu 1  1  r:t  ne.v  p 1  ants  in 
East Germany. 
3.3  Investment  needs  and  catching-up  of  the  peripheral  Community 
countries 
The  ~~noiroous  arrount  of  capital  which  Is  needed  to reconstruct  the  East 
Ger,.an  econany rtnght  have  lrr()llcations for  the catching-up process  in the 
less-developed  EC  countries.  Since the German current-account  surpius has 
noN  dIsappeared,  the  Ccmrun I ty  has  becane  an  101X)rter  of  capita  1  .  This 
has  contributed  to  the  Increasing  scarcity  of  capital  in  the  wo•·Jd. 
However,  the actual  Impact  of German  unification on  the  rising  Jevel  of 
rea I  1 nterest  rates  may  be  sma I I  In  QUant I tat  I ve  terms.  Other  factors 
such  as  the general  opening-up of Eastern Europe and  the SOviet  Union are 
rrore  1111)0rtant  and  suggest  that  the  level  of  rea I  Interest  rates  wi II 
probably remain  relatively high  In future. 
The  real-Interest-rate  effect  on  the  catching-up  prcx::ess  in  the 
less-developed  EC  countries will,  of  course,  be  to crowd  out  the  least 
proouct I ve  t nvesbnent projects.  HoNever,  the countrIes cor1eer ned c.ou r  d  at 
their  discretion  protect  or  Increase  the  rate  of  return.  Appropriate 
poI I  c I es  mIght  therefore  CCJ'11)ensate  reI  at  I ve  I y  eas I I y  for  the 
rea 1-1 nter·est-rate effect. 
A  further  question  Is whether  East Gennany will affect  the expected  rate 
of  return  dlr·ectly.  If  Investment  currently  being  undeitaken  In 
Industries  enjoying  a  comparative  advantage  In  the  less-developed 
Community countries were to  become more profitable  In simi tar  industries 
In  East  Germany,  the shift  In  Investment  would  take place.  However.  the 
r 1  sk  of  d I roct  corc:>et I t I on  between  East  Germany  and  the  ca  tr.:h 1  ng-up 
countr I es  Is  I  ON_  The  camparat I ve  advantages  are d I f ferent.  East  G::r  mttny 
w I I 1  not  be  a  1  ON-wage  country.  ThIs,  hoNever,  Is st  I 1  I  the  nli~ in  factor-
mak t r!g  i nv~stment  attractIve  In  the  catchIng-up  countr 1  es.  There  is, 
therefore,  little risk  that  planned  Investment  proJects  wll t  be  sl11 Fted 
fran  the catch·lng-up countries to East Germany.  Of  course,  the situation 
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is different  In  the Eastern European  countries where  low  real  wages  wi I I 
be  a  decisive  factor  In  the catching-up process.  These are the countries 
that wl  I I  compete with peripheral  EC  countries for  real  lnvesbrent. 
4.  Lessons 'for Europe 
German  econan  I  c,  rronetar  y  and  soc I  a I  unIon,  as  we I I  as  the  poI i t I  ca I 
unification  of  the  two  countries  have  attracted  attention  as  possible 
models  for  both  Western  European  Integration  and  Eastern  European 
transformation.  At  the end  of  this paper,  we  would  like briefly to turn 
to this  Issue. 
4.1  German  unification and Western  European  Integration 
The  drc:matlc  slunp  In  the  output  of  East  Germany's  productive  sector 
after monetary union  is often Quoted as an example of what might occur  if 
two  extremely  different  economies  were  to  fonm  a  monetary  union. 
HoNever,  such canpar isons miss  the point  in  so  far  as the sharp  fall  In 
act I  vI ty  In  the East German  econany was  not  caused  by  IntroducIng  a  new 
legal  tender  (monetary  Integration)  but  by  the  exposure  of  the  economy 
overnight  to world  market  competition  (real  integration).  Thus,  It  was 
not  the abolition of  the  exchange-rate  instrument  (monetary  protection) 
but  the abolition of  rigid  trade barriers  (real  protection)  which  caused 
the  collapse  of  the  East  German  econany,  Ill-eQuipped  as  it  was  to 
survive  In  world-market  conditions  (although  the  3CX1X»  real  appreciation 
In  the Ostmark  certainly magnified  the existing  problems).  This  led  to 
what  Is  called  a  permanent  taste  shock,  leading  to  the  disastrous 
deve I  opnents  for  East  German  product I  ve  potent I  a I .  Never the  I  ess,  it  Is 
worttmhlle exMllning  sane  Issues  regarding Western  European  integratior,, 
name I  y  ( I)  the  conseQUences  of  the  IntegratIon  of  factor  and  goods 
markets  for  price -and  wage  levels and  Inflation rates,  (I I)  the evolution 
of  productIvIty,  wages  and  the  wage-denonstrat I  on  effects  and  theIr 
repercussions  on  the  Investment  cl lmate,  (II I)  the  need  for  real 
exchange-rate  adJustment  when  national  savings-Investment  balances 
change,  and  (tv)  the  role of,  and  preconditions  for,  significant  public 
transfers within the EC. 
As  mentIoned  ear I 1  er,  the  IntegratIon  of  the  West  and  East  German 
econanles  has  led  to an  eQuallzat ton  of  prIce  levels  for  goods  on  both -68-
markets.  The  prIce of  services  Is also converging  rapidly  and  the  same 
Is  true  of  the  prIce of  labour.  In  the  case  of  Gennan  urd f !cat ion,  a 
very  pronounced  wage-dennnstrat I on  effect  was  to  be  expected.  pushIng 
East  German  wages  to  levels  unjustified  by  productivity  performance. 
Indeed.  the  IntegratIon  of  factor  and  gcxxJs  markets  1  n  Germany  has 
accelerated  the  process  of  real  convergence  while  the  convergence  of 
Inflation rates  In both parts of Genmany will  be achieved only after  the 
adJustment period. 
HoNever •  thIs  does  not  Imp I y  a  convergence  of  supp  I y-s  I de  cond It  Ions 
since  the convergence of  ~roductlvlty levels  lags  behind  the convergence 
of  wage  I eve Is;  thIs,  In  turn,  lire:> I I es  a  sIgnIfIcant  doNrwar ct  adjustment 
t n  anp I oyment  wIthIn  I ON-product I vI ty  sectors  In  East  Germany.  In  the 
case of the European  Integration process,  If a  simi tar wage-demonstration 
effect  were  to operate after  the  Introduction of  a  single currency,  the 
requIred convergence of supply condl t Ions would  be put at  r lsk.  HaNever, 
as  the  European  laboUr  market  Is  much  less  Integrated  than  the  German 
I abour  market,  mor-e  sIgnIfIcant wage dIfferent  I a Is  shou  1  d  be  susta  I nab I e 
without  large-scale  labour  movenents  and  any  wage-<taronstratlon  effect 
shou I d  be  I ess pronounced  than  In Germany. 
Given  the  uneven  structure  CCJY1)8red  wIth  other  EC  countr I es,  there  is 
thus  every  reason  to  be  cautious  In  drawing  unduly  far-reaching 
cone I us Ions  fran  a  canpar I son  between  EMJ  and  German  nnnetar·y  union.  In 
an  economic  sense,  Gennan  unification means  that  two  very distinct types 
of  labour  force  are  Integrated to an  extent which will  be  observed  only 
In  the  very  long  term  In  Europe.  They  differ  substantially  In  size, 
prOduct 1  vI ty and  sector  a I  structure of  El'f1) lo~nt whereas  their  I eve I  of 
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education and  vocational  skills diverge to a  lesser extent. 
German  economic  Integration suggests that  the marginal  rate~ of return on 
lnvesbment  converge  as  the  Integration of capital  markets  proceeds.  The 
same  wi 11  be  true  In  the canrunlty context.  However,  as  labour  wt II  be 
less  rroblle  In  the  COT1runlty,  part lclpat  lng  countr le-s  will  be  able  to 
ach 1  eve  the  approprIate  rate  of  return  on  Investment  through 
differentiated real  wage  levels,  an option which  Is not  aval table to East 
Germany. 
40'See a I so Franz  ( 1991). 
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German  un I f I cat  1  on  has been ac:xx:J11)an I ed by a  marked sh  I ft In the nat  I ona I 
savings-Investment  balance  as  a  conseQUenCe  of  a  hUge  supply-demand  gap 
In  East  Germany.  ThIs  shIft,  haNeVer,  has  been  eas  I ly achIeved wIthout 
rna Jor  dIstort  Ions  of  wor I d  trade  and  cap  1  ta  I  markets  and  wIthout  the 
sanetlmes  predicted  significant  real  appreciation  of  the  D-Mark.  The 
substantial  adJustment  In  Germany's  bilateral  trade  balance  has  not 
necessitated significant price changes;  adjustment was  facilitated by  the 
existence  of  excess  capacity  abroad  which  enabled  proctucers  to  adjust 
their  output  easily without  the  need  to crowd out domestic demand  via a 
real  appreciation  of  the  German  currency.  Furthermore,  International 
(European)  markets  have  reached  a  high  level  of  Integration at Which  the 
cross-border  transact  I on  costs  of  trade  have  been  reduced  to  such  an 
extent  that  substantial  signals  are  no  longer  reQUired  to  stlrrulate 
cross-border  trading.  OJnsequently,  there  Is  an  Increasing  likelihood 
that  the  hoped-for  catching-up  processes  In  the peripheral  countries  In 
Europe  and  the  necessary  changes  In current-account  balances might  also 
be  achieved  withOut  ser lously  affecting  real  exchange-rate movenents  In 
the  o:mrun 1  ty.  1  ndeed,  gIven  favourab  1  e  oond It  Ions  for  Investment, 
financial  Integration  facilitates the catching-up process  as  the current 
account constraint  Is alleviated. 
In  the  Genman  case,  the  need  for  very  substantial  transfers  to  support 
the East German  econany  Is due to the  1  nadeQUate  I  eve  I  of CCJI1)et It  I veness 
In East  Germany,  whIch was made worse by the  I ntroduct  I on of the D-Mark. 
As  such  d I f f I cu 1  t I es are rruch  I ess acute  In Europe,  there w I I I  be no  need 
for  public  transfers  of  a  similar  magnitUde.  The  German  case  also 
Indicates  that  large-scale  and  unilateral  public  transfers  becane 
relevant only after the harmonization of regional  systems of taxation and 
soc  1  a I  secur i ty has  taken pI  ace. 
4.2  German  unification and  Eastern EurQPean  transformatlon46 
The  East. German  econcmy  was  supposed  to  be  the  rrost  mxtern  and  roost 
C011)et 1  t I  ve  arrong  the  neN I  y  I I  bera  I I  zed  eoonan I  es  In  Eastern  Europe. 
conseQUent 1  y,  the  co  1 I apse  of  the  East  German  eoonany  after  the 
Introduction of market conditions has  been  a  disappointment  for  those  In 
favour  of  transforming  other  Eastern  European  ecxx'1Cmles  via  a 
46  see  also  JME  (1991)  and Fels/Schnabel  (1991). -70-
once-and-for-a  I I  shock.  tt::wever,  the  German  exper lment  was  unIQUe  In 
many  respects  and  need  not  be  lm I tated  by  other  Eastern  European 
countries;  In any event,  those countries do not  have a  donor  prepared  to 
stab  I I I ze  purchasIng  J)(Mer  and  per  capIta  I ncane  over  the  pa i nfu  1 
adjustment  per lod.  A  f I seal  constraint  and  a  severe  current-account 
constraint  force  these  other  Eastern  European  countr les  to  look  for 
dl fferent  approaches  to  the  transformation  of  their  econantes. 
Never  the  I ess,  sane  Issues  and  experIences  fran  the  German  case  are  of 
Interest  In this respect. 
German  rronetary  and  poI It  I ca  I  unIon  has  fac  I I I tated  two  of  the  three 
major  tasks  In  transforming  a  centrally  planned  econcmy  Into  a  market 
econany. 
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F I rst  I y,  It  has  a I I  ONed  the  I ntroduct  I  on  of  the  I ega  I 
frsne.vork  for  a  market  econcmy  without  any  time-lag.  Secondly,  It r.as 
facilitated macroeconanlc  managenent  since,  unlike  In other  Central  and 
Eastern  European  countries,  no major  Inflationary problems  are  emerging 
and  funct I on I ng  f I nanc  I a I  markets  are  provIdIng  the  capIta  I  needed  for 
the  rebu I I dIng  of  the  East  German  econany.  HoNever,  monetary  unIon may 
have  made  the  third  essent tal  task  considerably  more  dl ff  leu It,  I .e. 
m  I croeconan  I  c  adJustment.  In  thIs  respect.  the  IntroductIon  of  the 
D-Mark  and  the  mergIng  of  the  two  German  econan  I es  have  shortened  the 
transIt  I  ona I  per 1  od  and  I ed  to  enormous  pressure  for  the  rapId 
t ntroduct  I on of market behavIour. 
For  Eastern  European  countr I es,  the  exchange  rate  and  foreIgn  trade 
policies  required  will  be  QUite. dl fferent.  Rapid  tntegrat ton  Into  the 
world  econany,  Involving  the  Introduction of a  convertible currency  for 
externa  1  and  I nterna  I  transact Ions,  w I I I  I ead  to  sIgn  I f I cant  market 
losses  for Eastern producers  In the absence of effective  Import barriers. 
Ha.Yever ,  adverse  consequences  for  output,  E111J I  O)ment  and 
production-related  Income  can  be mitigated via appropriate macroeconomic 
managsnent .  ExIst  I ng  budgetary  constraInts  may  restr  I ct  the 
stabll lzatlon role of  fiscal  policy so that  temporary protection  for  the 
market  vta  the exchange rate and  other  Instruments wit I  be crucial  for  a 
successful  transition.  Indeed,  management  of  the external  sector  should 
consider  not only the export but also the  lf11)0rt  performance.  In order to 
restrict  the  Import  of  consumer  goods  and  to  foster  a  restructuring of 
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the  domestic  capital  stock  with  the  help of  cheap  Imports of  lnvesbnent 
goods,  appropriate measures  to discriminate  against  imports  of  consumer 
goods  In  favour  of  Imports  of  Investment  goods  seen  des  I rab  I e.  lrll)Ort 
barriers,  preferattly  ·1n  the  form of tariffs on  consuner  goods  that will 
be  phased  out  over  time,  may  alleviate same  of  the pressure on  domestic 
prcx:tucers and may  generate same additional  revenue  for  the public sector. 
Such  r·evenue  is  desperately  needed  since  an  efficient  social  security 
systan w I t I  t1ave  to be estab  I I shed  to cope wIth hIgh  uneJil) I o~nt, and  a 
redistribution  In  favour  of  transfer  lncane  wi II  be  unavoidable  as 
production  fal Is. 
Box  6  :  Tariffs and  subsidies versus  the exchange  rate  instrument 
- o  stylized view on  potential  policy choices  for Eastern European  economies-
---------------- Goal  Instrument 
Tariffs on  Imported  Depreciation 
consuner  goods 
------------·---------------------------------
Attract  foreign  investment  via 
- low  wages 
- low  taxes 
- cheop  investment  goods 
Foster competitiveness on 
domestic market  via 
- low  production  cost~ 
-high prices  for  c~peting imported 
goods 
Foster  competitiveness  on 
foreign morkot  via  . 
- low  production costs 
- export  subsidies 
Balancing public  f inar:ce 
Keeping  inflation ur.der  control 






net effects negative 
support• goal 
net effects negative 
detrimental  to goal 
detrimental  to goal 
detrimental  to goal 
detrimental  to goal 
supports goal 
detrimental  to. goal 
supports goal 
neutral 
detrimental  to goal 
------------···--·-· ·-------------------------------
Recommendation  :  import  tariffs on  consumer  goods  and  contract  with  trade  unions  not  to  include 
into wage  cloTms  higher  Inflation as a  result of  higher  import  prices. 
------··-·--------·---------------------------------
In  the case of Gennany,  the replacenent of the non-convertible Ostmark  by 
the  convertible  D-Mark  In  conditions  of  a  300'Kt  appreciation  created  a 
significant  convertible-currency money  stc:x::k  lnmedlately;  this,  in  turn, 
pern11tted  t.lie  fina:'"lcing  of  an  lfll)Ortant  lnfiON  of  consuner  goods  and 
crowde1  out:  dcmestic prOduction.  The existence of a  fiscal  constraint  in 
othe!- Eastern  European countrIes and  the need  to  lfl1)0rt rn:>dern  i nvesbnent 
goods  means  that  tt1ey  will  not  be  able  to run  similarly  large def lclts -72-
on  the trade balance for consuner  goods.  In fact,  the absence o-f  healthy 
domestic hard-currency savings means  that  these countries  need  a  healthy 
trade  surp  I  us  In  oonsuner  goods  to  fInance  the  necessary  modern 1  ze.t ion 
and expansIon of the danest  I  c  capIta  1 stock. 
In  the  short  term,  East  Germany  might  not  benefit  at  all  tran  Its 
I ntegrat  I on  Into  the  I  nterna  I  market  of  the  EC.  On  the  one  hand.  East 
German  producers could not make  use of unlimited market access since they 
dId  not  manufacture  any  OCJ1l)et It  I ve  products.  On  the  other  hand.  tht::Y 
were  not  a I I ONed  to d I scr lm I nate agaInst  products  of  EC  or  I gIn.  Eastern 
Eurapean  countries could  perhaps  do so.  Furthennore,  they could  probably 
benefIt  fran  un I lm I ted  access  to  the  EC  market,  as  sane  of  the  i r 
products,  e.g.  raw  mater I a Is,  are  a I ready  OCJ1l)et It  i ve  w 1  thout  being 
heavily subsidized.  Such market  access could make  It easier  to achieve a 
trade  surp  I us.  It  wou I d  a I so  reduce  the  need  for  un  I I atera  I  pub 1 1  c 
transfers  from Western to Eastern Europe. 
Wage  I eve Is  In  m  I d-1990  and  deve  I opnents  thereafter  have  been  a  major 
obstac  I  e  to  successfu  I  restructurIng  of  the  exIstIng  cap  1  ta  1  stock  in 
East  Germany.  Indeed,  enterprIses'  I lm I ted  f I nanc  I a I  resources, 
desperately  needed  for  Investment  purposes,  went  to  f lnance  an 
excessively high wage  and  salary bl I 1.  In transforming an~,  there 
Is Obviously  a  severe  risk  that  wage  and  productivity developments will 
be  out  of  step.  In  the  case  of  East  Germany,  wage-format I on  processes 
have  been  dominated  by  a  very  closely  Integrated  all-German  labour 
market ,  ba I I I ng~t by  West  German  taxpayers  and  other  soc  I o-cu  I tura  1 
processes.  Other  countries  In  transition  may  witness  similar 
developments  as  a  result  of  a  prl~age-prlce  spiral  following 
devaluations  and  gradual  adjustments  of  regulated  prices  to  market 
prIces.  Such  a  pr I ce-wage-pr Ice sp Ira  I  has at  I east  been  avoIded  so  far 
In East  Germany  since the choice was  for  an  overvalued  exchange rate and 
a  onEH:>ff  prIce  adjustment  when  the  new  and  convert lble  currency  was 
I nt  reduced. 
With  unification,  the West  German  economic,  social  and  legal  system  was 
copied  In  East  Germany.  In  general,  this  has  underpinned  market  forces 
and  has encouraged  foreIgn  (so far maIn I y  West  German}  dIrect  Investment. 
However,  as explained  In earlier  sections,  direct  Investment  has  not  yet 
proved as buoyant  as ant I  c I pated.  The weakness of d I rect  I  nvestrne~t stens • 
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rna in  I  y  fran uncertaIntIes over  the approach to be adopted  In dea  I I ng wIth 
the  remnants of  the old system,  namely uncertain property rights  In  land 
and  capIta  I ,  enterpr 1  se  debt  and  eco  I og I  ca  I  burdens.  The  s I  ON  pace  of 
foreign direct  Investment  In East Germany  Indicates that Eastern European 
cou1,tr 1  es shou 1  d  avo  1  d  sh 1ft  I ng  the burden of the o I d  system onto foreIgn 
Investors. 
l'loreover,  these  countrIes  are  1  n  dIrect  c:x:J11)et It  I on  wIth  per I phera  I 
Western  European  countries  and  with countries  In Africa,  Asia  and  Latin 
/Jmer I ca  for  d I rect  Investment  f IONS.  Even  In  East  Germany, 
notw  1  thstand  1  ng  1  ts  very  generous  1  nvestment  schemes,  foreIgn  Investors 
are not  nunerous and  the vo  I une of West  German  Investment  In East Germany 
shou 1  d  be  cons I derecl  as  a  spec  I a I  case  and  un I Ike  I y  to  be  repeated  In 
other  parts  of  Eastern  Europe.  ConseQUently,  countries  In  transition 
wl I 1  have to place great  reliance on  domestic private capital  to finance 
the  take-off  of  the  econany.  For  th  1  s  a  very  favourab I e  Investment 
env i rorment  1  s  needed.  Such  an  env  I rorment  wou I d  provIde an  appropr I ate 
economic  framework  accompanied  by  generous  tax  Incentives  for  Investment 
out 1  ays.  The  services  sector  w I I 1  grON  a lrrost  autanat I ca I I y  once  the 
;.:>ut look  for danest lc purchasIng pa.yer  11'1l)roves.  As  regards prIvatIzatIon 
of  the  exIst  1  ng  cap 1  ta  1  stock  ( 1  n  manufacturIng),  the  f I sea  I  revenue 
aspect  should  not  dominate  the design of  programmes  In  the countries  In 
transIt  I on,  as  the  ef  feet  on  net  revenue  w I I I  In  any  case  be  QUIte 
marginal.  Furthenmore,  a  dynamic privatization process alleviates fiscal 
pressure  on  the  pub I I  c  budget  and  shou I d,  therefore,  be  a  top-pr I or  I ty 
task  In these countries,  given the fiscal  constraint they  face. 
The  East  German  adnlnlstratlon  and  public  Investment  schemes  play  a  key 
ro  1  e  1  n  cop  1  ng w 1  th the cha 1  1  enge of the econan lc catchIng-up process.  A 
shortage  of  skilled  adnlnlstrators  and  operational  public  Investment 
pI  ans  has  hIndered  the  trans  format I on  process  up  to  nON.  HaNever,  as 
both  are  nON  Improving,  prospects  for  a  rapid  recovery  after  the  deep 
s I LITlP  have  lfll)roved  sIgnIfIcant  I y.  ConseQUent I y,  the  actn In  I stratI  ons 
e I sewhere  In  Eastern  European  shou I d  prepare  for  these  cha I I enges  by 
deciding as QUickly as possible on  the  legal,  administrative and economic 
ru  I es to be  lfll)  I anentec:J,  so that they can start to prepare actn In  I stratI  ve 
structures for  these new  challenges. -74-
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